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OCCAM’S PHASER: MAKING PROPORTIONAL
DISCOVERY (FINALLY) WORK IN LITIGATION
BY REQUIRING PHASED DISCOVERY
Michael Thomas Murphy*
ABSTRACT
This is an article about solving the problem of expensive electronic
discovery in litigation by simply learning the most important facts first. Judges
and parties often complain that the scope of information included in fact
discovery in civil litigation is overinclusive and disproportionate to size of the
dispute, resulting in overly expensive costs. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure recently changed again to further emphasize the use of
“proportional” limits in discovery, but provide little practical mechanism for
parties, lawyers, and judges to make discovery “right-sized.” This Article
proposes that parties should be required to “phase” discovery by first setting
the initial scope of discovery in a case as small as practicable and focused on
the most important, outcome-determinative facts, and then following this small
scope of discovery with additional “phases” if needed. The scope of discovery
will then become incrementally broader in scope during each phase, but will
only do so upon a showing of need for additional discovery. Phased discovery
is used sporadically in litigation, often with success. This Article discusses
these successes, considers potential drawbacks of phasing, and asks the key
question: why wouldn't it work?
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INTRODUCTION
It is clear that discovery in Federal Cases must become less expensive.1
But how? As electronically stored information (ESI) cost continues to dwarf
litigation budgets, judges and clients are pushing lawyers to limit discovery.2
The recent reemphasis on proportional discovery in the 2015 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the latest visible iteration of that push.3
But even those amendments only increase emphasis, which amounts to
encouragement, not requirement.4 Parties are still free to set the limits of
discovery as broad as they wish.5
This Article considers a more stringent approach to proportionality, in
which the parties have to set limits to discovery. It examines the effectiveness
of requiring discovery to be held in “phases,” where the parties, with judicial
oversight (and control if necessary) set the initial scope of discovery in a case
to be proportionally as small as practicable, followed by any number of
additional phases. The discovery “in play” in a case will then become
incrementally broader in scope during each phase, but will only do so upon a
showing of need, instead of a hurried and ill-informed analysis at the outset of
the pleading phase of a case.
Part I is a recitation of the current law and past practice of
“proportionality” with respect to the scope of discovery, as described in the
Federal Rules, case law and scholarship. It examines in particular the struggle,
and sometimes reluctance, of judges to set a scope of discovery in civil cases. It
also describes the 2015 revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which place added emphasis on proportionality in discovery. It ends with a
discussion of whether the revised rules go far enough toward achieving
proportional discovery and suggests that the current system places too much of
an onus on the parties’ cooperating to make the scope of discovery “rightsized.”
Part II suggests that Courts should anticipate conflict over the proportional
scope of discovery and phase that discovery. In that way, discovery starts
small, and grows only upon a showing that such growth is reasonable and
necessary for the finding of truth. While this approach has its drawbacks and
may not be appropriate for all circumstances, it is more likely than the current
system to ensure that the discovery in each case is right-sized, preventing
nuisance settlements and bloat. This Part cites cases and systems in which
1. See Gordon W. Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, Proportional Discovery: Making It the
Norm, Rather than the Exception, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 513, 513 (2010) (discussing the high
costs of the current discovery system and declaring the system to be “broken”).
2. See id. at 513-14.
3. Jay Tidmarsh, The Litigation Budget, 68 VAND. L. REV. 855, 855-57 (2015).
4. Id. at 875.
5. Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 517 (discussing a tension between broad
discovery and just, speedy resolution of disputes).
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phasing is used, to positive effect.
Part III examines the obstacles of implementing phased discovery,
anticipating resistance to the idea of changing the discovery process and
examining the strengths and weaknesses of such resistance.
The article briefly concludes in Part IV with a discussion of phased
discovery’s place in modern litigation, and whether it is a logical response to
big data’s disrupting litigation, drawing a parallel to computer-assisted review.
I.

PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY AND WHY IT’S SO HARD TO ACHIEVE

Discovery in a lawsuit is, at its core, a mechanism by which parties and a
factfinder collect and review information to determine what “really” happened.
It is a quest for truth.6 Discovered information becomes admissible evidence to
be used at a trial, where a factfinder weighs the litigants’ competing assertions
of truth. It is not a perfect system.7 It was never intended to be a perfect
system.8 Even still, the system provides for a comprehensive collection,
exchange, and examination of all relevant information as a means to locate and
bring forth the truth.9 The default rule is that all such information should be
collected, reviewed, and considered, no matter how ultimately important to the
factual or legal determinations at issue.10
Often, “all of the relevant information” is a lot of information. It can be too
much information.11 Simple math dictates that, under the American system, a
party facing a $50,000 potential judgment in a lawsuit but $100,000 in legal
6. Robert G. Johnson, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 15 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 1, 1 (1982) (describing discovery as “an adversary proceeding in which is undertaken a
‘search for truth.’” (quoting People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 139 N.E.2d 780, 783 (1957))).
7. See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 515 (collecting sentiment and concluding that
“[j]udges and litigants now routinely describe modern discovery as a ‘morass,’ ‘nightmare,’
‘quagmire,’ ‘monstrosity,’ and ‘fiasco.’” (footnote omitted) (twice quoting AM. COLL. OF
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM.
LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AMERICAN
LEGAL
SYSTEM
app.
B
at
B-1
to
B-2
(2008),
http://www.actl.com/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/cm/ContentDisplay.cfm&Conten
tID=3650; then quoting PSEG Power N.Y., Inc. v. Alberici Constructors, Inc., No. 1:05-CV657 (DNH/RFT), 2007 WL 2687670, at *1, 8, 12 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2007)).
8. Id. at 514.
9. This is not the case in other countries. For example, one commentator noted that
“[t]he rest of the world rejects ‘fishing expeditions’ and tolerates decisions based on limited
information in a way we do not.” Richard L. Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Adapt to Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, in SHIRA SCHEINDLIN & DANIEL
CAPRA, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE 22 (3d ed. 2015).
10. See Milberg LLP, Hausfeld LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies Not in Our
Rules . . ., 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 131, 139 (2011) (describing “open-deck” discovery).
11. See John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil
Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 573-77 (2010) (discussing the negative effects of
excessive discovery costs).
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fees for discovery in that lawsuit has an easy, if morally questionable decision
to make: the prudent move is to settle the suit for up to asking price regardless
of the merits.12
This is no mere fantastic hypothetical. For example, e-discovery vendor
DTI cites this case study:
[A] corporate client defending itself in a matter in which plaintiff’s proposal
for expanded discovery would actually have cost more than the entire amount
at issue in the case! The original discovery request was for seven core
custodians,13 requiring collection of 38GB of data; of that, 1.4GB (or less than
4%) was determined to be relevant after searching the data with the latest
technology, using client-supplied search terms. The cost of discovery for those
seven custodians was a reasonable $10,000, but in a motion to compel, the
opposition requested an additional 65 custodians. Looking at actual processing
and searching performed for the original custodians, reasonable per-unit cost
estimate was established and, in response to the motion, the court was
provided with an affidavit showing tiered costs: actual costs for the original
seven custodians, and cost projections that included half (39 total) and all (72
total) of the additional custodians requested in the new motion. Based on the
original “sample” of seven, discovery experts were able to project collection
of all additional custodians at a cost of $153,000, an amount clearly out of line
with the $140,000 at issue in the entire case. In light of the documented lack of
proportionality between the discovery request and the value of the case, and
given the low percentage of relevant data in the initial sample from the most
promising custodians, the motion to expand scope made little sense and was
dismissed.14

It is that “easy” decision that inspires commentators to declare the
discovery system “broken,” “flawed,” and so forth.15 A 2008 survey by the
12. Id. at 573, citing AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF
TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
THE
AMERICAN
LEGAL
SYSTEM
app.
A
at
A-4
(2008),

http://www.actl.com/AM/TemplateRedirect.cfm?template=/cm/ContentDisplay.cfm&Conten
tID=3650.
13. A “custodian” in this context is a person who has discoverable data in his or her
possession or control.
14. Samantha Green, Proportionality. Are Discovery Costs Proportional to the Value
and Importance of the Case?, ORANGE CTY. ATTORNEY JOURNAL (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://attorneyjournaloc.com/blog/2015/04/04/proportionality-are-discovery-costsproportional-to-the-value-and-importance-of-the-case/.
15. As it has been pointed out, though, that was the original intent of unlimited
discovery. See Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 10, at 139 n.24 (“[T]he right of
free and unlimited discovery before trial . . . [will] probably result in the disposition of much
litigation without the need of trial.” (quoting Martin Conboy, Depositions, Discovery and
Summary Judgments, 22 A.B.A. J. 881, 884 (1936)). This is unquestionably true today, but
the modern view of this result is that it is a problem, not a solution. See Charles M. Yablon
and Nick Landsman-Roos, Discovery About Discovery: Sampling Practice and the
Resolution of Discovery Disputes in an Age of Ever-Increasing Information, 34 CARDOZO L.
REV. 719, 721 (2012) (noting, among other examples, that “the [modern] controversial
heightened pleading standard . . . is expressly designed to protect certain defendants from
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Federal Judicial Center of lawyers in 3550 cases found that roughly a quarter of
attorneys believed that the costs of discovery in their cases were “too high”
relative to the amount in controversy, and roughly a third felt that discovery
costs generally influence settlement.16 Roughly half of the attorneys surveyed
knew of at least one client who settled a case primarily because of litigation
costs, including discovery costs.17
A. The Solution Is: Less Discovery. But How?
“Fixing” the system falls on cost control. It is imperative to make
discovery less expensive, so that that same $50,000 judgment case costs less
(hopefully far less) than $50,000 to litigate. But how? Increases in document
review technology can drive down costs and are a helpful development, if
notably hesitantly adopted.18 But with the amount of information created by
litigants (and everyone else) only increasing, litigants, judges, and scholars
have put a greater emphasis on a fairly radical idea: just limit discovery to the
important information.
This idea is “fairly radical” because it is in some sense at cross-purposes to
the quest for truth. By limiting discovery, the actors in a lawsuit are
consciously disregarding relevant information, which in many instances, given
the imperfect nature of human recollection, no witness will remember. That
information remains in the “unknown unknown,”19 and the limiters of
the ‘burdens of discovery,’ which are said to be ‘sprawling, costly and hugely timeconsuming.’” (first quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670 (2009); then quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007))).
16. JUDGE DAVID G. CAMPBELL, MEMORANDUM TO JUDGE JEFFREY SUTTON RE:
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE at Rules Appendix B6 (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/18218/download, [hereinafter June 2014
Rules Report].
17. Id.; cf. Ann G. Fort, Rising Costs of E-Discovery Requirements Impacting
Litigants,
LAW.COM
(Mar.
20,
2007),
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=900005554136/Rising-Costs-of-EDiscoveryRequirements-Impacting-Litigants?slreturn=20160317173351 (estimating a cost of $2.70 to
$4 per email produced); Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery:
A Proposal for Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV.
473, 474 n.4 (2010) (“Discovery should not be a sporting contest or a test of wills,
particularly in a bankruptcy case where the parties’ resources are limited and the dollar value
of the stakes is often low[.] [The parties’] conduct in the discovery phase of this matter ha[s]
significantly multiplied its burdens, both on the Trustee and the Court.” (quoting In re
Spoonemore, 370 B.R. 833, 844 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007)) (second and third alterations in
original)).
18. See Ralph C. Losey, Predictive Coding and the Proportionality Doctrine: A
Marriage Made in Big Data, 26 REGENT U. L. REV. 7, 25 (2013-2014) (describing a slow
adoption of predictive coding despite obvious benefits due to an initial lack of judicial
approval).
19. This idea is commonly attributed to Donald Rumsfeld, who famously stated:
[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are
known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there
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discovery are relying on their own imperfect knowledge and judgment to
disregard information.
However, this “self-service” system of limitation has been languishing in
the Rules of Civil Procedure as the best imperfect solution to discovery’s
proportionality problem.20 For many years before its 2015 amendment, Rule
26(b)(2)(C) provided a system of proportionality that was restrictive, kicking in
essentially when a litigant objected to the amount of discovery sought. 21
Buttressing this concept was Rule 26(g)(1)(B)(iii), which requires a lawyer
signing a discovery request (or response or objection) to certify that “to the best
of [his or her] knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable
inquiry,” the discovery demanded is “neither unreasonable nor unduly
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in
the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in
the action.”22 Litigants have a responsibility to the system and themselves to
agree to keep discovery affordable and proportional.
B. Proportionality’s Long Journey Around the Federal Rules
That responsibility is not lost on rule-makers. The rules seem to prescribe
proportional discovery, but it remains a legal mechanism that is, by many
accounts, underutilized, with over half of federal judges ignoring the rule
altogether and commentators calling the proportionality rule more of a “ripple”
in the law than a sea change.23
are also unknown unknowns—the ones don’t know we don’t know.

MARK STEYN, Rummy Speaks the Truth, Not Gobbledygook, DAILY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 9,
2003,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/personal-view/3599959/Rummy-speaks-thetruth-not-gobbledygook.html. But it is also fairly common in project management circles.
See Bonnie Biafore, Project Management Fundamentals, LYNDA.COM (Dec. 14, 2011),
https://www.lynda.com/Business-Skills-tutorials/Project-Management-Fundamentals/807802.html.
20. See Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 517.
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (2014) (amended 2015).
22. FED R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1).
23. Jordan M. Singer, Proportionality’s Cultural Foundation, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 145, 180-81 (2012) (quoting 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD
L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2008.1 (3d ed. 2011)). Singer writes:
As one group of commentators noted, the “paucity of reported cases” citing to or applying
the rule demands the conclusion that “the amendment itself seems to have created only a
ripple in the caselaw.” Other commentators have offered less charitable assessments,
concluding that Rule 26(b)(2)(C) has been “ineffective,” “seldom used,” and “ignored” by
the courts. Even federal judges, the most obvious beneficiaries of the 1983 proportionality
provisions, have acknowledged that they very rarely invoke Rule 26(b)(2)(C) on their own.
Professor Miller himself lamented years later that the provisions have “all been largely
ignored.”

Id. (footnotes omitted) (first quoting The Judge’s Role in Discovery, 3 REV. LITIG. 89, 123
(1982) (comments of William F. Schwartzer); then quoting WRIGHT ET AL., supra, § 2008.1;
then quoting Jessica DeBono, Comment, Preventing and Reducing Costs and Burdens
Associated with E-Discovery: The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
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Indeed, this lack of acceptance is likely the reason that commentators have
noted a “peripatetic existence” of the proportionality rules, observing that they
tend to breeze around the Federal Rules, moving to Rule 26(b)(2) in 1993,
sharing time between Rule 26(b)(1) and Rule 26(b)(2) in 2000, then ending up
(for the time being) in Rule 26(b)(2)(B) in 2006.24 Rule 26(b)(2) in its 1993
version sought to empower courts to limit discovery when necessary and stated
that:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of
discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines
that: . . . (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action, and
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. 25

The 2000 Amendments added a “redundant” cross-reference to the limitations
in Rule 26(b)(2) to the end of Rule 26(b)(1).26
Through this time, an emphasis on proportionality gained some ground.
Some courts, such as the Seventh Circuit, have adopted proportionality
considerations within their rules.27 In other instances, judges have developed
Procedure, 59 MERCER L. REV. 963, 969 (2008); then quoting Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey
Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV.
327, 349 (2000); then quoting Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause is Bad Medicine for the New EDiscovery Rules, 21 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 49, 60-61 (2007); and then quoting Edward Becker
et al., Transcript of the “Alumni” Panel on Discovery Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 809, 815
(1998)). Singer then cites data showing that “[n]early sixty percent of federal district and
magistrate judges in a recent survey reported that they ‘almost never’ invoke Rule
26(b)(2)(C) on their own initiative.” Id. at 181 n.116 (quoting CORINA GERETY, TRIAL BENCH
VIEWS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY ON CIVIL PROCEDURE 31-32 (2010)). See also
id. (“[T]he proportionality principle of Rule 26(b)(2) . . . is not being used by
judges”(quoting Ronald J. Hedges, Annotation, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A
Critical Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
227 F.R.D. 123, 127 (2005))).
24. Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 874-75; see also Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M.
Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV 20 (2015).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (1993) (amended 2000).
26. Jonah B. Gelbach & Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Law and Economics of
Proportionality in Discovery GA. L. REV. (forthcoming) (Univ. of Pa., Inst. for Law & Econ.
Research Paper No. 15-1; George Mason Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 15-02, 2014),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2551520.
27. See Sean R Gallagher & Lauren E. Schwartzreich, The Proportionality Test:
Resolving E-Discovery Disputes in Employment Litigation (Midwinter Meeting of the Am.
Bar Ass’n Employment Rights and Responsibilities Comm., 2010),
http://apps.americanbar.org/labor/errcomm/mw/Papers/2010/data/papers/005.pdf; see also
Seventh Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program, Proposed Standing Order Relating to
the
Discovery
of
Electronically
Stored
Information
§ 1.03
(2009),
http://www.ilcd.uscourts.gov/Statement%20-%20Phase%20One.pdf (suggesting that parties
use a proportionality analysis prospectively and that discovery requests “should be
reasonably targeted, clear, and as specific as practical.”); D. Md., Suggested Protocol for
Discovery
of
Electronically
Stored
Information
(“ESI”)
¶ 8(I),(K),

Spring 2016]

OCCAM'S PHASER

97

this analysis into something more robust. In Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v.
William Morris Agency, Inc., U.S. Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV
developed an eight-factor proportionality test for e-discovery considering:
(1) the specificity of the discovery requests; (2) the likelihood of discovering
critical information; (3) the availability of such information from other
sources; (4) the purposes for which the responding party maintains the
requested data (5) the relative benefit to the parties of obtaining the
information; (6) the total cost associated with production; (7) the relative
ability of each party to control costs and its incentive to do so; and (8) the
resources available to each party.28

What proportionality cases one can find tend to use the Rowe factors.29
Courts also have looked at slightly different factors, such as “(i) the
number and complexity of the issues; (ii) the location, nature, number and
availability of potentially relevant witnesses or documents; (iii) the extent of
past working relationships between the attorney and the client, particularly in
related or similar litigation; and (iv) the time available to conduct an
investigation.”30 A “reasonable” search with respect to proportional discovery
“is reasonable not on some idealized notion of adequacy, but ‘reasonable under
the circumstances.’”31 However, there is no apparent authority in rules or case
law giving adequate guidance on how to appropriately weight any of these
factors.32
All of this examination does not add up to the widespread use of devices to
limit discovery, however, as evidenced by a commentator’s note that:
There thus exists a striking disconnect between the goal of proportionality
embedded in the Federal Rules and the imbalanced reality of modern
discovery. While not entirely a failure of the rules, this disconnect is
https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/news/news/ESIProtocol.pdf (requiring, in working model for
e-discovery, that Rule 26(f) conference discussions specifically include a proportionality
analysis).
28. 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). For a full discussion of the Rowe decision,
see Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 530.
29. Netzorg & Kern, supra note 1, at 530; Zubulake v. UBS Warburg,
217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (Zubulake I) (explicitly adopting the Rowe test).
30. Steven C. Bennett, E-Discovery: Reasonable Search, Proportionality, Cooperation,
and Advancing Technology, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH & PRIVACY L. 433, 437-38 (2014)
(quoting S2 Automation, LLC v. Micron Tech., Inc., No. CIV 11-0884 JB/WDS, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 120097, at *99-100 (D.N.M. Aug. 9, 2012)) (citing I-Med Pharma Inc. v.
Biomatrix, Inc., Civ. No. 03-3677 (DRD), 2011 WL 6140658 (D.N.J. Dec. 9, 2011); St. Paul
Reins. Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511 (N.D. Iowa 2000)).
31. Bennett, supra note 30, at 437 (quoting In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust
Litig., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1350 (N.D. Ga. 2012)).
32. Laporte & Redgrave, supra note 24, at 44 (“The current Federal Rules (and
associated Advisory Committee Notes) do not give specific direction to litigants and courts
on how to properly consider the factors listed. Litigants and courts have factors, but no
systematic approach for breathing life into those factors and ensuring that all applicable
factors are considered. Accordingly, we lack the benefit of coherent and predictable case
law.”).
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attributable in part to the failure to address proportional discovery, a concept
that is easy to articulate in general terms, yet can be difficult to implement in
practice.33

C. Proportionality in the 2015 Amendments: Is It Over, Did We Win?
Proportionality was once again on the move in 2015, switching back to
Rule 26(b)(1) and a role of more prominence, establishing it as “a concept that
is central to defining the appropriate scope of discovery.” 34 Indeed, “[t]he
committee suspected that the location of the proportionality standard, ‘buried
among other discovery provisions, hindered its effectiveness.’”35
The new Rule 26(b)(1) states:
[A party] may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is
relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the
case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the
amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the
parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and
whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.36

The draft Committee Note to Rule 26 explains that proportionality is the
“collective responsibility” of the parties and the court.37
Commentators have noted that “the approach of moving the rule around,
rather than changing its substance, suggests that, while the Advisory
Committee understands that disproportionate discovery remains a problem for
litigants and the courts, the Committee does not see an obvious alternative rule
or amendment that would better address the problem.”38
Further, it has been noticed that the rule itself is shifting from the reactive
to the prospective. That is to say that proportionality generally comes up in
litigation when a litigant oversteps his bounds and requests discovery clearly in
excess of a reasonable scope, at which point his adversary objects, invoking the
proportionality rules.39 Should the parties be unable to resolve this objection,
33. Id.
34. Christopher Benning & Daniel Toal, Proportionality: Rarely Used, Primped for a

Return?, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 2, 2014 (“By moving the proportionality rule out of Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(2), ‘Limitations on Frequency and Extent,’ into 26(b)(1), which is entitled ‘Scope in
general,’ the Advisory Committee seems to be signaling to parties and judges that the
proportionality rule should no longer be seen solely as a limit on the scope of discovery.
Indeed, the new location confirms that that the Advisory Committee instead views
proportionality as a concept that is central to defining the appropriate scope of discovery.”).
35. Gelbach and Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 4 (quoting THE SEDONA CONFERENCE
COMMENTARY ON PROPORTIONALITY IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE
WORKING GROUP SERIES 3 (Jan. 2013)).
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
37. Gelbach and Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 12.
38. Benning and Toal, supra note 34.
39. Dustin B. Benham, Proportionality, Pretrial Confidentiality, and Discovery
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the court will step in to resolve it. Thus a proportional scope is set out of
conflict, not cooperation. The new rule would change that, encouraging parties
and judges to take extra time and collaborate, to the extent practicable, at the
outset of the case to set a reasonable scope for discovery. Commentators have
noted that “[t]hus, under the proposal, proportionality—first introduced in a
less-prominent form in the 1983 amendments to Rule 26—would take center
stage in setting the scope of discovery.”40
The purpose of the change is, as the Chief Justice wrote, to address the
“most serious impediments to just, speedy, and efficient resolution of civil
disputes.”41 The Committee Notes to the 2015 Amendments hope to rally
support behind proportionality and deserve close examination. For example,
they summarize proportionality’s FRCP journey as follows:
Restoring proportionality as an express component of the scope of discovery
warrants repetition of parts of the 1983 and 1993 Committee Notes that must
not be lost from sight. The 1983 Committee Note explained that “[t]he rule
contemplates greater judicial involvement in the discovery process and thus
acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating
basis.” The 1993 Committee Note further observed that “[t]he information
explosion of recent decades has greatly increased both the potential cost of
wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to be used as an
instrument for delay or oppression.” What seemed an explosion in 1993 has
been exacerbated by the advent of e-discovery. The present amendment again
reflects the need for continuing and close judicial involvement in the cases
that do not yield readily to the ideal of effective party management. It is
expected that discovery will be effectively managed by the parties in many
cases. But there will be important occasions for judicial management, both
when the parties are legitimately unable to resolve important differences and
when the parties fall short of effective, cooperative management on their

Sharing, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2181, 2223 (2014). Benham writes:

Currently, attorneys are expected to exercise discretion to frame discovery requests within
the scope allowed by Rule 26(b)(1), and if they fail to do so, opposing counsel can request
limitations, or protections, from the court. Likewise, current rule 26(g) mandates that
attorneys who sign discovery requests certify that the requests are, among other things,
proportional. If necessary, the court then exercises its discretion to refine discovery along
those same lines.
The amendments, however, would emphasize attorneys’ obligation to consider what is
proportional when they exercise their discretion to frame discovery requests in the first place.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
40. Id. at 2222 (footnote omitted).
41. The 2015 discovery amendments were, unusually, front and center in Chief Justice
Roberts’s 2015 Year-End Report. John G. Roberts, Jr., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4 (Dec. 31, 2015) [hereinafter ROBERTS 2015 REPORT],
http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf (“Many rules
amendments are modest and technical, even persnickety, but the 2015 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are different. Those amendments are the product of five
years of intense study, debate, and drafting to address the most serious impediments to just,
speedy, and efficient resolution of civil disputes.”). The Chief Justice’s echoing of the
language of Rule 1 is no accident. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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There’s an inherent rhetorical tension in this long passage between selfregulating proportionality from the parties, and judicial involvement. If you
break down the Committee’s message into simple bullet points, it reads like
this:
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x

Like we said before
There will have to be close judicial involvement
Because parties cannot always keep discovery proportional
Especially now that we have to deal with Big Data.
So there needs to be close judicial involvement
In those cases where parties cannot always keep discovery
proportional
But parties can sometimes keep discovery proportional
Though sometimes they cannot keep discovery proportional
In which case there needs to be close judicial involvement
For those cases where the parties cannot keep discovery
proportional.

The analysis above cannot be much more reductionist when one puts it this
way, but it is now easy to see the tension. Where does party autonomy stop, and
judicial intervention begin? It reads as if the drafters want to call for increased
judicial intervention, but do not want to have to call for such intervention. That
is to say it would be better for everyone if the intervention were not needed, as
judges are already overworked and cooperation between counsel should be the
norm. However, as the data have shown, lawyers are simply not happy with the
amount of discovery and their own ability to cooperate as both adversaries and
partners in dispute resolution.43 If lawyers banded together and mutually
agreed to reduce proportionality at the cost of the occasional advantage in
individual litigations, that may create a sea change. But that system only works
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendment (alteration in
original) (discussing the impact of the “information explosion” on the 1993 changes to Rule
26).
43. June 2014 Rules Report at B-6 to B-7.

Id.

Surveys of ABA Section of Litigation and NELA attorneys found more than 80% agreement
that discovery costs are disproportionately high in small cases, with more than 40% of
respondents saying they are disproportionate in large cases. In the survey of the ABA Section
of Litigation, 78% percent [sic] of plaintiffs’ attorneys, 91% of defense attorneys, and 94%
of mixed-practice attorneys agreed that litigation costs are not proportional to the value of
small cases, with 33% of plaintiffs’ lawyers, 44% of defense lawyers, and 41% of mixedpractice lawyers agreeing that litigation costs are not proportional in large cases. In the
NELA survey, which included primarily plaintiffs’ lawyers, more than 80% said that
litigation costs are not proportional to the value of small cases, with a fairly even split on
whether they are proportional to the value of large cases. An IAALS survey of corporate
counsel found 90% agreement with the proposition that discovery costs in federal court are
not generally proportional to the needs of the case, and 80% disagreement with the
suggestion that outcomes are driven more by the merits than by costs. In its report
summarizing the results of some of the Duke empirical research, IAALS noted that between
61% and 76% of the respondents in the ABA, ACTL, and NELA surveys agreed that judges
do not enforce the rules’ existing proportionality limitations on their own.
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as well as its worst actor, and research (as well as a 30-year history of
proportionality struggles) suggests that a self-regulating system is unlikely to
be effective.44
Even the drafters grudgingly admit that, as time goes by, proportionality in
discovery increasingly requires judicial intervention. One can see such an
admission in a memorandum by the Chair of the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure stating that one of the goals of the 2015
amendments is that:
Case management will begin earlier, judges will be encouraged to
communicate directly with the parties, relevant topics are emphasized for the
initial case management conference, early Rule 34 requests will facilitate a
more informed discussion of necessary discovery, proportionality will be
considered by all participants, unnecessary discovery motions will be
discouraged, and obstructive Rule 34 responses will be eliminated. 45

That sounds like a win-win-win, but it is important to note that nothing in
the Federal Rules prevents parties (or judges) from doing just that in 2012 or
2014, making the rule change not altogether “new.” And, it has been noted that
“attention to the proportionality provisions has grown since 1994, and
endorsement of their use has widened.”46 However, as the rule change shows,
courts and attorneys (and especially, clients) have not seen the widespread use
of proportionality that such attention and endorsement should engender.
D. Why Hasn't Proportionality Caught On?
That is to say, if proportionality is so important and so useful, why is it still
considered a “growing” trend and not a ubiquitous part of discovery?47 Why
don’t judges take the more active role contemplated by (and now almost
required by) the rules? Scholarship shows no shortage of thoughtful reasons.

44. Id. at B-6, stating:
Other surveys prepared for the Duke Conference showed greater dissatisfaction with the
costs of civil discovery. In surveys of lawyers from the American College of Trial Lawyers
(ACTL), the ABA Section of Litigation, and NELA, more lawyers agreed than disagreed
with the proposition that judges do not enforce Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to limit discovery. The
ACTL Task Force on Discovery and IAALS reported on a survey of ACTL fellows, who
generally tend to be more experienced trial lawyers than those in other groups. A primary
conclusion from the survey was that today’s civil litigation system takes too long and costs
too much, resulting in some deserving cases not being filed and others being settled to avoid
the costs of litigation. Almost half of the ACTL respondents believed that discovery is
abused in almost every case, with responses being essentially the same for both plaintiff and
defense lawyers.
45. Id. at B-14.
46. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2008.1 at 158 (3d ed. 2010).
47. Gelbach & Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 4 (“The focus on organizational changes
in the 2014 Amendments suggests the committee continues to assume that the apparent
shortfall in judges’ and parties’ use of the proportionality standard results partly from a lack
of awareness of the proportionality standards’ applicability to their case.”).
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A key problem may be that the factors in the proportionality rules are not
weighted, making for a difficult test.48 Another problem could be that a natural
tendency exists to use the amount in controversy as the dominant factor to
determine proportionality. We are, after all, examining cost.49 That tendency is
likely to be helpful in cases such as a commercial dispute among litigants on
equal financial footing, but troublesome in cases involving significant
nonmonetary rights such as actions to enforce constitutional or statutory
rights.50 This is likely why “the importance of the issues at stake in the action”
is moving to the front of the new rule and “the amount in controversy” is
moving back.
The most recurrent problems, however, come from three sources. First,
proportionality of discovery, or its proper scope, must be set early on in a case,
when facts are generally not well-known nor arguments well-developed. This
tension can be somewhat described thusly:
It is widely acknowledged that the proportionality rule is difficult to apply,
particularly at the early stages of discovery. Perhaps the most widely
acknowledged problem with the [proportionality] rule is that it requires judges
to make, at a very early stage, estimations about the merits of a case, which
judges are characteristically reluctant to do.51

48. Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 875-76 (“In deciding whether ‘the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,’ a court considers ‘the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues.’ No particular weight is
given to any factor. Such open-ended, multi-factor tests breed uncertainty and are subject to
manipulation.” (footnote omitted)).
49. Indeed, a practice note from the law firm Jones Day belies this tendency. In
discussing the adoption of the 2015 FRCP Amendments, the drafters write that “simply
noting that the amount in controversy is large and the responding party’s resources are
substantial is not a sufficient proportionality analysis. Rather, the benefit of the information
requested should be weighed against the costs. Conversely, a hefty price tag does not alone
indicate ‘disproportionality.’ All proportionality factors must be considered.” Laura E.
Ellsworth et al., Significant Changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Expected to
Take Effect December 1, 2015: Practical Implications and What Litigators Need to Know,
JONES DAY (September 2015), http://www.jonesday.com/significant-changes-to-the-federalrules-of-civil-procedure-expected-to-take-effect-december-1-12015-practical-implicationsand-what-litigators-need-to-know-09-25-2015.
50. See, e.g., Kleen Prods. LLC v. Packaging Corp. of Am., No. 10 C 5711, 2012 WL
4498465, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2012); John B. v. Goetz, 879 F. Supp. 2d 787, 887 (M.D.
Tenn. 2010) (“Yet, with repeated judicial findings of the Defendants’ violations of children’s
rights to medical care under federal law, any cost of ESI discovery is far outweighed by the
benefits of the improved health of the children in this state.”]
51. Benning & Toal, supra note 34 (footnote omitted). The authors continue:
This challenge leads to few written decisions on proportionality grounds. In fact, the lack of
case law on the topic to assist judges in making these difficult judgments is among the factors
that perpetuate the lack of case law on the topic: Judges are even less inclined to make these
difficult and precarious determinations when they do not have case law on which to base their
decisions.

Id. This is so; case law on proportionality in discovery is relatively scarce.

Spring 2016]

OCCAM'S PHASER

103

This statement presupposes that the proportionality of discovery is itself an
estimation of the merits of a case. It’s not, but one-shot discovery, with little
recourse on appeal, can make it seem that way.52
Second, parties tend not to agree on the proper proportions of discovery,
particularly when those proportions are tied to the “dollar value” of the claims,
which is often the key (sometimes only) metric in play.53 So the common
perception that the system can adopt proportionality by “requir[ing] either by
protocol or local rule that there be a discussion of proportionality before the
discovery plan required by Rule26(f) is submitted to the court”54 is
troublesome. For judges and longtime practitioners can—and do—say that it is
one thing to require litigants to discuss something, and another thing entirely to
convince them to work together in good faith to reduce the scope of a lawsuit.55
That is to say that the 2015 amendments only increase emphasis on
proportionality, instead of requiring it. Parties are still free to set the limits of
discovery as broadly as they wish.
It is a practice that is in some ways, to some practitioners, antithetical to
the concept of zealous advocacy, and also a practice that, in the short term and
for the short-sighted, takes money away from a lawyer’s accounts receivable.56

52. Dan H. Willoughby Jr., Rose Hunter Jones & Gregory R. Antine, Sanctions for EDiscovery Violations: By the Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 797-98 (2010) (“Appellate review
of e-discovery sanction cases has been limited, perhaps because many cases settle or are
otherwise not appealed.”). Also, a major law firm’s yearly e-discovery update noted
“infrequent instances where e-discovery was addressed squarely by a circuit court of
appeals.” 2011 Mid-Year E-Discovery Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 22, 2011),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2011Mid-YearE-DiscoveryUpdate.pdf.
53. Ralph C. Losey, Lawyers Behaving Badly: Understanding Unprofessional Conduct
in E-Discovery, 60 MERCER L. REV. 983, 997-98 (2009) (“Parties in litigation, especially at
the commencement of a case when discovery plans are formed, rarely agree on the value of a
case. This disagreement produces disputes regarding what effort is fair and reasonable under
the circumstances.”).
54. John L. Carroll, Proportionality in Discovery: A Cautionary Tale, 32 CAMPBELL L.
REV. 455, 462 (2010).
55. Liesa L. Richter, Making Horses Drink: Conceptual Change Theory and Federal
Rule of Evidence 502, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1669, 1678 (2013); Netzorg & Kern, supra note
1, at 528 (“Attorneys are required to zealously advocate for their clients. Excessive or
evasive discovery tactics are among the most commonly used tools to induce a favorable
settlement—or to deter a claim altogether, depending on which side abuses the process.
Unless and until attorneys are forced to make discovery proportionate, the abuses outlined in
this article will continue. Guidelines, to put it bluntly, are not enough.”); Michael J.
Hanrahan, Game-Changing Federal “Proportionality” Discovery Rule Effective December
1, 2015, FOX, O’NEILL, SHANNON, S.C. (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.foslaw.com/newsviews/game-changing-federal-proportionality-discovery-rule-effective-december-1-2015
(“Unending discovery becomes a settlement tactic, not an investigational tool.”).
56. The idea that smaller discovery scope equals less money for lawyers is generally
not accurate. In the long term, an efficient lawyer will grow his client base through a
reputation for bringing cases to resolution quickly and under budget. But the idea, however
misguided, persists, and therefore judges and rule makers must account for it. See Patrick
Oot et al., Mandating Reasonableness in a Reasonable Inquiry, 87 DENV. U. L. REV 533,
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Rules, judges, and practitioners all stress, as is just and proper, open and honest
cooperation between parties in setting the scope of discovery and the best
means of avoiding injustice.57 But when the law is practiced by people—not
just people, but lawyer people—of varying degrees of reasonableness, such
open and honest cooperation is not ubiquitous.58 Put another way, the system of
setting proportional discovery must anticipate the uncooperative and the
conflict-driven.
Third, and perhaps foremost, the current discovery system of setproportionality-and-go is an all-or-nothing proposition.59 That is to say, the
scope of discovery is set, along with a deadline, at the beginning of a case,
often at the Rule 16 conference. The judge sends the parties off with an order in
hand, and, with the weariness of a parent handing the car keys to a teenager, an
admonishment to try to solve disputes amicably this time. Discovery then
proceeds along that scope, and adhering to that deadline, expanding scope only
upon the showing of good cause, and extending the deadline only on agreement
and/or judicial order.60 But the “fact period” of discovery remains an all-ornothing proposition: discover now or forever hold your peace.61
Practitioners note that hard discovery deadlines which cover the entirety of
546-48, 557 (2010) (citing a “noticeable lack of positive feedback when attorney [sic] do
conduct efficient discovery,” and stating that “[t]he bar must empower itself to seek
knowledge on reasonable discovery.”).
57. See Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, supra note 10, at 3.
58. Craig Ball, E-Discovery on a Budget, 3RD ANNUAL UF LAW/EDRM ELECTRONIC
DISCOVERY CONFERENCE MATERIALS (2015), http://www.edrm.net/2015-uflaw/materials
(“Poor communication and lack of cooperation between parties on e-discovery issues
contribute markedly to increased cost. The incentives driving transparency and cooperation
in e-discovery are often misunderstood. You don’t communicate or cooperate with an
opponent to help them win their case on the merits; you do it to permit the case to be
resolved on its merits and not be derailed or made more expensive by e-discovery
disputes.”).
59. Oot, supra note 56, at 537 (positing that under the current discovery regime, “all
possible” relevant information becomes a money game).
60. Karl Schieneman & Thomas C. Gricks III, The Implications of Rule 26(g) on the
Use of Technology-Assisted Review, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 239, 255 & n.54 (2013) (“The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, case law, and the Sedona Principles all further emphasize
that electronic discovery should be a party-driven process.” (quoting Romero v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 271 F.R.D. 96, 109 (E.D. Pa. 2010))).
61. Somewhat famously, in Justice Stevens’s dissent in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
he agreed with plaintiffs’ proposal to phase discovery, stating that had he been the district
court judge, he would have allowed key depositions to occur before dismissing the
complaint. 550 U.S. 544, 591-93 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Suzette M. Malveaux,
Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery Can Address the
Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 135-36
(2010)). Commentators have pointed to this opinion and to phasing as an answer to accessto-justice issues inherent in heightened pleading standards. See, e.g., Ryan Mize, Comment,
From Plausibility to Clarity: An Analysis of the Implications of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and
Possible Remedies, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 1245, 1265-66 (2010) (discussing minimal phased
discovery).
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the discovery permissible in, and proportional to, a case are somewhat
antithetical to “speediness,” a goal of discovery so critical it appears in Federal
Rule No. 1. Short time periods “may actually create incentives for requesting
parties to issue overbroad requests (for fear they will have only a single
opportunity to make such requests).”62 This all-or-nothing system “can lead to
massive document productions—along with expensive and time-consuming
document reviews—much of which has only tangential relevance to the merits
of the case.”63
There is an inherent tension between a system that may be most beneficial
for the litigants, but requires an all-or-nothing decision from lawyers not
inclined to cooperate and operating with limited information. Taking that
tension one step further, while there is hope that a renewed interest in discovery
may limit discovery in some cases,64 practitioners also fear that setting
boundaries for discovery too early in the lifespan of a case, as the 2015
amendments encourage, may create a “mini trial” of sorts in which parties will
litigate the scope of discovery extensively, defeating the purpose of keeping
costs low.65 Put that way, the lack of success for the proportionality rule is not
all that surprising.
Will the amendments finally create that success? That remains to be

62. Benning & Toal, supra note 34.
63. Id.
64. See Benham, supra note 39, at 2224-25.
Taken together, the amendments, combined with continued criticism of what some view as
overbroad discovery, may create momentum in some courts to narrow the scope of discovery
significantly, at least as a practical matter. For some commentators, the changes are a tepid
step toward international litigation norms. Some in practice describe the potential change as
almost cataclysmic. The truth is probably somewhere in the middle—the scope amendments
will substantially narrow discovery in some cases but will not, as predicted by some, end
pretrial litigation as we currently know it.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
65. Id. at 2224 (“At a minimum, the changes could prompt a wave of discovery
disputes based on allegations that discovery requests are not proportional to the case.
Reacting to the re-crafted scope provision, litigants and courts will undoubtedly pay more
heed to proportionality.”); see also Gelbach and Kobayashi, supra note 26, at 18:
Greater reliance on a judicially managed proportionality standard will involve a number of
challenges. Will parties have the proper incentives to report the information that judges need
to carry out proportionality analysis? Will the parties even have that information at the time
that the standard will be applied? How will judges determine the implicit weight to place on
nonquantifiable factors involving the importance of nonmonetary issues in a case? How good
a job will judges do forecasting the merits value of the (yet-to-be-provided) requested
information in question? Whatever the answers to these questions, we can expect an increase
in the variation in adjudication due to the discretionary factors written into the
proportionality standard.

The result of that mini-trial will not likely be overturned on appeal, given appellate courts’
general deference to the trial court’s judgment in discovery disputes. See, e.g., Nat’l Hockey
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (holding that discovery
disputes are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, where the question is not
whether the appellate court “would as an original matter have [acted as the trial court did]; it
is whether the [trial court] abused its discretion in so doing.”).
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seen. Months before their adoption, a federal court used its discretion to apply
proportionality in the spirit of the 2015 amendments. In a February 2015 case,
Adair v. EQT Production Co., a class action, the court limited discovery
beyond a certain boundary because the burden and expense of obtaining it
outweighed a likely benefit, citing a “yardstick of proportionality” in doing
so.66 The court specifically cited the then-forthcoming 2015 amendments as
guidance in formulating this limitation.67
Consider also Siriano v. Goodman Manufacturing Co.,68 one of the first
2015 opinions using the recently-revised proportionality rule.69 This was a
products liability case in which the defendant balked at certain discovery,
stating that it would be unduly burdensome to review and produce.70 The
magistrate judge stated that “‘restoring proportionality’ was the ‘touchstone of
revised Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope of discovery provisions’ with the move of
proportionality from Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)) to Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(1).”71 Finding that the discovery in question was potentially important
albeit difficult to produce, "the Court ordered a discovery conference to discuss
possibly conducting discovery in phases."72 The Court also charged the parties
to “engage in further cooperative dialogue in an effort to come to an agreement
regarding proportional discovery."73
These judges still had to use discretion, take guidance, and put forth
substantial effort to instill proportionality in these particular cases. To that, end,
do the 2015 amendments go far enough? Could they do more?
II.

A PROPOSED PROPORTIONALITY SOLUTION: MANDATORY PHASED
DISCOVERY

What this Article proposes is that, in many cases, judges should be
required to create scheduling orders to require the parties to "phase" discovery.
66. Adair v. EQT Prod. Co., No. 1:10CV00037, 2015 WL 505650, at *5-6 (W.D. Va.
Feb. 6, 2015); Brian K. Cifuentes, Proportionality: The Continuing Effort to Limit the Scope
of Discovery, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS. (March 18, 2015, 5:21 PM),
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/articles/31951/proportionality-continuing-effort-limitscope-discovery (discussing Adair).
67. Id.
68. Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., No. 2:14-cv-1131, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165040 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015).
69. See, e.g., Joshua Gilliland, Proportionality is like The Force, BOW TIE LAW’S
BLOG, (Dec. 22, 2015), https://bowtielaw.wordpress.com/2015/12/22/proportionality-is-likethe-force (last visited: Dec. 22, 2015).
70. Id. (citing Siriano, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165040, at *15).
71. Id. (quoting Siriano, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165040, at *16).
72. Id. (emphasis added).
73. Id.(quoting Siriano, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165040, at *20). The Court further
noted that Rule 1 now charges the Court and the parties with ensuring a “just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.” Id. (quoting Siriano, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 165040, at *19).
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That is to say, at the outset of the case, the judge orders the parties to meet-andconfer as part of their Rule 26 organizations and attempt to set a scope of
discovery, as prescribed by the revised rules. But the proposed judicial action
here goes much farther, in that the judge would also ask the parties to meet and
confer with respect to the most important facts to be discovered, and the most
important information custodians for each side. With that knowledge in hand,
the judge would ask the parties to set a "first phase" of discovery, at the initial
Rule 16 conference, covering only the most important discovery. Should the
parties fail to reach an agreement, the judge would then set the scope and
timing of the "first phase" based on submissions from the parties as to what that
first phase should be, using the standards set by courts to set the scope of
discovery as a guide.
That is to say, it makes sense for judges looking for guidance in setting the
scope of phases to look to some of the Rowe Entertainment factors for
proportionality, specifically: (1) the likelihood of discovering critical
information; (2) the availability of such information; (3) the purposes for which
the responding party maintains the requested data; (4) the relative benefit to the
parties of obtaining the information; (5) the total cost associated with
discovery; (6) the relative ability of each party to control costs and its incentive
to do so; and (7) the resources available to each party.
At the end of this first phase of discovery, the judge would bring the
litigants together at a subsequent “discovery” conference, which can (and
should) double as a settlement conference.74 At this conference, the parties
would discuss whether any additional discovery is necessary, and if so, whether
they have met and conferred so as to agree upon its scope. If the parties cannot
agree, the judge would, at his or her discretion, set an additional phase of
discovery. In theory, the number of phases would be unlimited; in practice it is
likely to be a relatively low number as parties will, with any effort and luck,
uncover the ultimate facts in a case, or at least sufficient facts in a case to
support a resolution of the dispute.75
Indeed, nearly this exact system is contemplated by the Committee Notes
to the 2015 Amendments:
The parties may begin discovery without a full appreciation of the factors that
bear on proportionality. A party requesting discovery, for example, may have
little information about the burden or expense of responding. A party
requested to provide discovery may have little information about the

74. There can, but does not need to be, a determination at the outset of discovery of a
set number of phases. Judges who want to calendar cases long-term with more consistency
might estimate a reasonable number of phases and build them into a scheduling order; other
judges may schedule all dates but make them subject to change in the event of additional
discovery phasing.
75. Yablon and Landsman-Roos, supra note 15, at 742 (“A court orders phased
discovery in the hope that the information disclosed in that partial discovery will make
further discovery unnecessary.”)
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importance of the discovery in resolving the issues as understood by the
requesting party. Many of these uncertainties should be addressed and reduced
in the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference and in scheduling and pretrial
conferences with the court.76

The driving thrust of the theory is that cases will settle early, upon
discovery of the most important evidence. Phased discovery compels litigants
to formally assess the strength of their case theory at pre-set benchmarks,
during which they must evaluate the discovered material.77
That is to say, after the most important discovery in a case is complete, the
parties should have enough sense of the admissible facts in a case to discuss
settlement on potentially more fruitful grounds. A savvy judge could even
entertain and decide motions in limine with respect to the most important
evidence of a case in between phases as a way to better provide a sense to the
parties of what may lurk ahead for them at trial. The idea of deciding a motion
in limine on an evidentiary issue before summary judgment is a little odd but
really should not be. After all, it is certainly helpful for summary judgment
briefing, at the very least. It is another step toward the long-discussed
realization that the overwhelming majority of civil cases do not go near
adjudication at a trial.78 Rather, the cases are decided in pretrial discovery and
motion practice, as each side builds a case and shows it off in the most effective
way possible. Settlements generally happen when one party (or more) has seen
enough. Phased discovery and inter-phase motions in limine are ways to
establish and decide enough of a case so that it can settle.
A. Phasing Has Worked
Phased discovery is not new. It has been around and it works.79 That is to
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 2015 Committee Notes supra note 42, at B-40.
77. Proportionality achieves this goal, albeit somewhat less stringently. See MICHAEL

J. HANRAHAN, Game-Changing Federal “Proportionality” Discovery Rule Effective
December 1, 2015, FOX, O’NEILL, SHANNON, S.C., (Oct. 21, 2015),
http://www.foslaw.com/news-views/game-changing-federal-proportionality-discovery-ruleeffective-december-1-2015 (last visited December 22, 2015) (“The new [proportionality]
standard cuts both ways. It prevents plaintiffs from using discovery to extract a ‘cost of
defense’ settlement (especially in a small case), and checks defendants’ prying into a
plaintiff’s background/finances when the yield is low.”).
78. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994); Samuel R. Gross & Kent
D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for
Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991) (“A trial is a failure. . . . [L]awyers, judges, and
commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than
trial.”).
79. See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 30, at 457 n.103 (citing Laura Hunt, Comments:
Trending: Proportionality in Electronic Discovery in Common Law Countries and the
United States’ Federal and State Courts, 43 UNIV. OF BALT. L. REV. 279, 298-303 (2014)
(referring to phasing as a technique to ease discovery burdens); Matthew A. Bills, 9 Ways to
Reduce E-discovery Costs; From the Experts, 2013 CORP. COUNS. 1, 1 (Sept. 6, 2013)
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say, in certain exemplary instances courts and parties have purposefully placed
their initial focus on the most important, relevant or determinative information
first, choosing to restrict the contours of discovery to exclude other
information, even if that information would otherwise be discoverable,
relevant, or probative.80 Leading commentators cite it with approval.81
In Haka v. Lincoln County,82 a magistrate judge implemented phasing
when faced with a classic proportionality problem. The case, a wrongful
termination action, involved a relatively low amount in dispute compared to the
(“conducting discovery in phases is an effective way to reduce costs by focusing the parties’
time and effort on the most critical discovery at the outset”); Hon. Paul W. Grimm, The State
of Discovery Practice in Civil Cases: Must the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and
Burdens, or Can Significant Improvements Be Achieved Within the Existing Rules?, 12
SEDONA CONF. J. 13 (2011) (“[The parties] can phase the discovery to focus first on a limited
sub-set of witnesses and documents that are most likely to yield the most evidentiary ‘bangfor-the-buck,’ while reserving the right to seek additional discovery in the future if warranted
by what the initial discovery has disclosed.”);; Sean R. Gallagher, Bringing Proportionality
Back into the Discovery Process: E-Discovery for the Other 97% of Us, 2013 A.B.A. SYMP.
ON
TECH.
&
EMP.
L.
1,
11
(Apr.
23,
2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2013/04/aba_national_symp
osiumontechnologyinlaboremploymentlaw/17_gallagher.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Dec.
22, 2015) (recommending phasing so that parties can be “better positioned to target future
discovery in a more efficient manner”); Milberg LLP, Hausfeld LLP, supra note 10, at 33
(Describing phasing upon agreement of counsel as an example of cooperation as a system
that “would incorporate a schedule whereby certain tranches of information would be
produced in sequence, and, in some instances, subject to the satisfaction of certain
thresholds. For example, counsel for the parties might agree to initiate discovery with the
production of information from the files of a set number of custodians, departments, or both,
with subsequent productions of other information from other custodians or departments to be
permitted only if certain showings are made.”).
80. The Sedona Conference features phasing in its most recent Commentary on
Proportionality, published in 2013, in which they write:
Under these circumstances, the court, or the parties on their own initiative, may find it
appropriate to conduct discovery in phases, starting with discovery of clearly relevant
information located in the most accessible and least expensive sources. Phasing discovery in
this manner may allow the parties to develop the facts of the case sufficiently to determine
whether, at a later date, further discovery that is more burdensome and expensive is,
nevertheless, warranted. In addition, given that the vast majority of cases settle, phasing
discovery may allow the parties to develop a factual record sufficient for settlement
negotiations without incurring the costs of more burdensome discovery that may only be
necessary if the case goes to trial.

THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON PROPORTIONALITY IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY,
(Jan. 2013) at 9, www.thesedonaconference.org (click “Publications” tab; then click “Sedona
Conference Commentary© on Proportionality” under “eDiscovery”).
81. See Losey, Predictive Coding, supra note 18, at 43:
In my opinion, electronic discovery production should almost always be conducted in phases.
This is in accord with Sedona’s second principle of proportionality, that, in general, litigants
should seek discovery from the most convenient, least burdensome, and least expensive
sources. As The Sedona Conference Proportionality Commentary indicates, parties should
always focus first on the low-hanging fruit. In other words, they should focus first on
evidence that is likely to have the most probative value and that is the most easily accessible.

(citing SEDONA, COMMENTARY ON PROPORTIONALITY (2013), supra note 80, at 8–9).
82. Haka v. Lincoln County, 246 F.R.D 577 (W.D. Wis. 2007).
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cost of reviewing the ESI. Faced with a classic proportionality problem, the
magistrate judge went through the factors set forth in the existing Rule
26(b)(2)(C), seeming to struggle somewhat with balancing the monetary aspect
of the case with the recognition that it involves a violation of important rights
for the plaintiff.83 It was clear that the cost to review and produce ESI would
near the amount in dispute somewhat quickly. The magistrate judge recognized
that neither party “ha[d] deep pockets.”84 Here, phasing and proportionality
provided the solution:
Having considered all the relevant factors, I conclude that fairness and
efficiency require the parties to proceed incrementally, limiting the initial
search to the e-mails stored on the hard drives. Plaintiff is required to narrow
his search terms to the narrowest set with which he is comfortable. Any
additional searches shall occur only by joint agreement or court order. 85

The costs of additional phases of discovery were to be split between the
parties equally. This case is a great example of an “easy” phasing case; the
discovery costs would have turned it into a “nuisance settlement,” and the
interests of fairness dictated at least taking a chance at finding the most
important evidence in a first phase.
Haka was an easy case. In a somewhat harder case, Mancia v. Mayflower
Textile Services Co.,86 a FLSA case, then-Magistrate Judge Grimm noted that
given the potential amounts in controversy plaintiff’s requested discovery
“might be excessive or overly burdensome,” but he lacked sufficient
information to make an informed ruling on that theory.87 Thus, the parties were
asked to estimate the potential damages, with zero being the best case scenario
for defendants, and with plaintiffs calculating the worst case scenario for
defendants.88 Then-Magistrate Judge Grimm noted that “[w]hile admittedly a
rough estimate, this range is useful for determining what the ‘amount in
controversy’ is in the case, and what is ‘at stake’ for purposes of Rule
26(b)(2)(C)'s proportionality analysis89 The purpose of this exercise was to
help the parties set a proportional budget for discovery.90 In doing so, thenMagistrate Judge Grimm recommended phasing discovery, which would, inter
alia, "enable Plaintiffs to reevaluate their needs depending on the information
already provided.”91 The judge stressed that the parties’ collaborations on

83. Id. at 579 (“Although the issues at stake in this lawsuit are important, the potential
damages are low, so that the cost of engaging in the ESI search plaintiff needs is
disproportionate to the available recovery.”).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 364 (D. Md. 2008).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 365.
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phase discovery would result, for the defendants, in “having to produce less
discovery, at lower cost,” and for the plaintiffs, “in getting helpful information
more quickly.”92 Both parties would save money, and in negotiating the phases
of discovery, the judge surmised that this process would “expedit[e] the time
when the case may be resolved on its merits, or settled.”93
Why phasing would expedite resolution is not answered in the opinion but
seems based on the idea that getting more discovery sooner and cheaper will
facilitate settlement.94 But this opinion also suggests another benefit that is less
obvious: that through negotiating phases, the parties will learn the strengths and
weaknesses of both cases, which can bring about a settlement as well.95
In another well-cited case, Barrerra v. Boughton,96 defendants accused of
racial profiling dug in against allegedly overbroad discovery requests from a
plaintiff that included forty custodians, an eighty-keyword search, and an
allegedly expansive date range.97 The defendants cited unduly burdensome
costs for such a large, one-shot discovery and proposed an initial phase of three
custodians over a limited date range.98 Plaintiffs refused to phase discovery, or
perhaps, put more diplomatically by the court, plaintiffs “could not agree” on a
first phase.99 The court sided with defendants, and ordered the parties to
attempt a first phase of discovery along the lines proposed by defendants.100 At
the time, commentators noted that “[t]he Court’s order for phased discovery
highlights a practical approach in searches of multiple custodians.”101
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Judge Grimm expressly states this point. See Grimm, The State of Discovery,

supra note 79, at 23 (“Judges who have ordered phased discovery, focusing first on that
which is most likely to reveal the most relevant information, permitting the parties to seek
additional discovery later (albeit with the possibility of cost-shifting), have found that they
seldom return for more. Rather, they cooperate in identifying key inquiries and information
and the most efficient means to discover it. If the parties then find that they must seek
additional discovery, that request is generally based on a far more accurate showing of
need.”).
95. See, e.g., Milberg LLP, Hausfeld LLP, supra note 10, at 9 n.26 (citing Judge
Posner that “A full exchange of the information . . . enabl[es] each party to form a more
accurate, and generally therefore a more convergent, estimate of the likely [case] outcome.”
RICHARD A POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 571 (6th ed. 2003). Most cases never go to
trial, so a settlement is essentially inevitable. See Mark R. Kravitz, The Vanishing Trial: A
Problem in Need of Solution?, 79 CONN. B.J. 1 (2005).
96. Barrera v. Boughton, No. 3:07cv1436, 2010 WL 3926070, at *3 (D. Conn. Sept.
30, 2010).
97. Id. at 2.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Joshua Gilliland, Phased Discovery: Undue Burden and Practical
Proportionality,BOW
TIE
LAW’S
BLOG,
(Oct.
7,
2010),
https://bowtielaw.wordpress.com/2010/10/07/phased-discovery-undue-burden-and-practicalproportionality (Last visited: December 22, 2015).
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Perhaps the most well-known example of phasing is that in place for cases
before Judge Paul Grimm in the United States District Court of Maryland.102
Grimm plainly states that he requires a two-step phasing of discovery in his
cases because “Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(c) and 26(g)(1)(B)(iii) require that
discovery in civil cases be proportional to what is at issue in the case, and
require the Court, upon motion or on its own, to limit the frequency or extent of
discovery otherwise allowed to ensure that discovery is proportional.”103
Grimm requires a first phase that is different from that described in this
article:
Phase 1 Discovery. The first phase of discovery should focus on the facts that
are most important to resolving the case, whether by trial, settlement or
dispositive motion. Accordingly, the parties’ Phase 1 Discovery may seek
facts that are not privileged or work product protected, and that are likely to be
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and material to proof of
claims and defenses raised in the pleadings. Phase 1 Discovery is intended to
be narrower than the general scope of discovery stated in Rule 26(b)(1)
(“discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s
claim or defense,” even if not admissible, if “reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence”).104

Here Judge Grimm contemplates the most important discovery first, and an
initial scope narrower than the current “one shot” discovery.105 This is very
similar to the phasing discussed in this article. However, he does require that
the first phase material discovery be “material to proof of claims and defenses
raised in the pleadings.” This limitation is commonsensical but may make the
first phase too narrow. First, it adds a bar to the first phase that provides an
opportunity for parties to fight as to whether certain discovery is sufficiently
“material” as to be included in the first phase. If the parties were to believe
certain facts that could bear on settlement may not necessarily be material to
claims and defenses raised in the pleadings, but want to include them in the
first phase, it makes sense to do so.
Grimm’s second phase creates somewhat of an all-or-nothing discovery:
Phase 2 Discovery. Unless the parties stipulate otherwise, the Court, upon a
showing of good cause, may permit discovery beyond that obtained under
Phase 1 Discovery. In Phase 2 Discovery, the parties may seek discovery of
facts that are not privileged or work product protected, are relevant to the
claims and defenses pleaded or more generally to the subject matter of the
litigation, and are not necessarily admissible under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, but are likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. A

102. See Judge Paul Grimm, “Discovery Order,” United States District Court, District
of Maryland, available at:
https://thesedonaconference.org/system/files/Judge%20Grimm%20Discovery%20Order.pdf
(Last visited: December 22, 2015).
103. Id.
104. Id. at ¶ 2(a) (emphasis omitted).
105. Id.
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showing of good cause must demonstrate that any additional discovery would
be proportional to the issues at stake in the litigation, taking into consideration
the costs already incurred during Phase 1 Discovery and the factors stated in
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(i)– (iii). If the Court determines that additional discovery is
appropriate, the Requesting Party will be required to show cause why it should
not be ordered to pay all or a part of the cost of the additional discovery
sought.106

Judge Grimm’s second phase is optional, and any discovery therein must
survive a showing of good cause not only that the discovery would be
proportional, given the costs already expended, but that costs of that discovery
should not be charged to the requesting party. While certainly effective at
countering potential abuse, the scope of this phase does lend itself to making
discovery more of an “all or nothing” endeavor in the first phase. A party must
set the first phase knowing that it risks bearing the full expense of such
discovery if it cannot convince Judge Grimm that costs should be shared.
The system of phasing proposed by this article is not as strict, though a
judge certainly could (and in some cases, should) fashion such restrictiveness
into subsequent phases. For example, a third or fourth phase in discovery
almost certainly should carry with it some measure of cost shifting, and/or be
limited in scope.
B. Phasing Fits Within the Rules
Commentators have often described phasing as a natural technique to
implement the proportionality concept, particularly in large volume cases.107
“Properly used, the proportionality tools available under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure can go a long way toward reaching the long sought-after goal
106. Id. at ¶ 2(b) (emphasis omitted).
107. See Carroll, supra note 54, at 460-61; see also Tonia Hap Murphy, Mandating Use

of Predictive Coding in Electronic Discovery: An Ill-Advised Judicial Intrusion, 50 AM.
BUS. L.J. 609, 647-48 (2013):
While FRCP Rule 26(b) explicitly grants courts the power to “limit” discovery, case law
shows that courts have imposed “limitations” to address proportionality problems, in cases
where the requested discovery was overly burdensome or costly, given the nature of the case
or the value of the information likely to be gained. This is consistent with the advisory
committee notes accompanying this rule. Orders to limit the number of interrogatories, limit
the universe of ESI to be examined, or phase discovery fit the plain meaning of the word
“limit.” Ordering a party to employ a different technology to search its own ESI would be
unlike those sorts of limitations and does not go to a concern about proportionality. Such an
order would not naturally be regarded as a “reduction” or “restriction” of discovery.

Phasing is also found in the prior rules. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee’s
notes to 2006 amendment (noting that, “because the court and parties may know little about
what information the sources identified as not reasonably accessible might contain, whether
it is relevant, or how valuable it may be to the litigation,” it may be appropriate for the
parties to engage in “focused discovery . . . to learn more about what burdens and costs are
involved in accessing the information, what the information consists of, and how valuable it
is for the litigation in light of information that can be obtained by exhausting other
opportunities for discovery.”).
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of Rule 1: securing the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.’”108 Indeed, the purpose of phased discovery is to bring
suits to an end as fast as possible; as one commentator writes, “a court orders
phased discovery in the hope that the information disclosed in that partial
discovery will make further discovery unnecessary.”109 The end goal of
phasing is quicker settlements, which goes to the heart of the cost-of-discovery
versus cost-of-litigation problem.
Of course, much of the past scholarship has viewed phasing as an optional
tool that litigants can use to meet the goal of proportional discovery. The new
rule suggests that the tool is not so optional, but does not seem to require much
more than an awareness or conversation about the scope of discovery. What is
proposed here is more radical; here a judge requires the parties to phase
discovery, whether the attorneys want to or not.
Judges would retain their discretion to determine (or better yet, allow
parties to determine) what discovery fits into each phase. For example, in many
cases, a first phase dedicated to evidence of liability would be appropriate
before a second phase dedicated to evidence of damages. Similarly, a case
might be split into phases that track the key legal requirements of each claim. A
breach of contract case, for example, might proceed with discovery regarding
an existence of contract, then a phase regarding a breach, and so forth.
Another potential benefit of phasing is that it adds “teeth” to the exercise in
which litigants must cooperate to achieve a common goal. The conversation
and awareness required by the revised rule now has a set outcome; the parties
know that discovery will be limited in the short term.110
Further, phasing sets a potentially more reasonable goal in that litigants do
not have to agree on the total scope of discovery at the outset of a case; rather
they must agree on the most important discovery, to be covered first.111 Of
course, one could argue that the more specific the goal of a consensus, the more
difficult it is to obtain.112

108. Carroll, supra note 54, at 461.
109. See Yablon and Landsman-Roos, supra note 15, at 742; see also Tamburo v.

Dworkin, No. 04 C 3317, 2010 WL 4867346, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 17, 2010) (ordering
phased discovery so as to keep discovery proportional and bring about a speedy resolution to
a case, specifically “to ensure that discovery is proportional to the specific circumstances of
this case and to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of this action . . . .”).
110. See, e.g., Grimm, supra note 102, at ¶ 3 (“[T]he parties and counsel are expected
to work cooperatively during all aspects of discovery to ensure that the costs of discovery are
proportional to what is at issue in the case . . . .”).
111. See SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY, supra note 80, at 9 (“Parties who wish to
conduct phased discovery must communicate with one another about the issues relevant to
the litigation and the repositories—both accessible and inaccessible—that may contain
relevant information. Moreover, the parties must cooperate with one another to prepare and
propose to the court a phased discovery plan.”).
112. It is relatively easy to obtain consensus among a group of hungry people that pizza
should be ordered; agreeing on toppings is another story.
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However once again, a rule should not be disregarded simply because it is
difficult to follow. Difficult times require difficult rules. There is much support
for the notion that increased cooperation amongst opposing counsel and parties
in discovery is absolutely essential to the sustainability of the discovery process
in light of big data.113 As admitted herein, there simply are not enough judicial
resources to carefully monitor each and every case from a granular discovery
perspective. Phasing—like all discovery—therefore cannot work effectively
without consistent and effective cooperation among counsel.114
Provided such cooperation exists, phasing carries the added benefit of
providing a mechanism for the parties to agree on the key issues in the case.
This is not far from an existing requirement of Rule 26(f)(2) that is often
overlooked by commentators and certainly by counsel, in that the parties must,
as part of their Rule 26 conference, “consider the nature and basis of their
claims and defenses and the possibilities for promptly settling or resolving the
case.”115 Agreeing on the most important discovery in a case so as to set phase
one of discovery in a mutually agreed fashion requires the parties to consider
the nature and basis of claims and defenses, and to a limited extent, share them
with the other side. This agreement can only help settlement, even if it ruins
tactical plans and “hide the ball” games.
By creating a greater, more collaborative dialogue, parties move ever
closer to agreeing on a resolution of the lawsuit; given the statistics with
respect to cases settling versus going to trial, this resolution can be called
nearly inevitable. In this sense phasing is more than idealistic; it is pragmatic,
as it speeds cases along to their likely conclusion at a settlement table.
III.

WHAT COULD POSSIBLY GO WRONG? EXAMINING THE
COUNTERARGUMENTS

Mandatory phasing lends itself to a certain amount of criticism, mainly of
the “what if?” variety. Part III of this Article discusses these potential criticisms
and examines whether they are real or paper tigers.
It would be easy to dismiss all criticism of phased discovery to be a
kneejerk reaction borne of inertia. After all, for many years, discovery has
generally been a one-phase, one-shot at the truth with all information
reasonably calculated to lead to discoverable evidence in the boat. Stepping
113. For a good survey of this point, see Bennett, supra note 30, at 441-45.
114. Professor Steven Gensler, in an essay, describes cooperation among counsel with

an analogy of a dartboard with a bulls-eye, where the outer rings are the bare minimum
cooperation required by civility, and the middle rings are an honest and forthright sense of
collaboration among counsel to bring about an efficient resolution of the dispute. See
Scheindlin & Capra, supra note 9, at 273. He cites phased discovery as an example of
cooperation in the bulls-eye, as an example of the highest level of cooperation, and one
towards which attorneys should strive. Id.
115
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
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away from that system to a phased discovery system requires a leap of logic
that resembles a leap of faith: an admission that all information that is
tangentially relevant to a case is flat out unnecessary to obtain a satisfactory
resolution of a dispute, even after trial.116 Once this philosophical hurdle is
overcome, there are several potential issues with compulsory phased discovery
worth examining:
x First, it could be said that phased discovery stretches already thin
judicial resources, particularly in cases where the parties cannot agree
to the scope of the phases.
x Next, phased discovery may obfuscate a “drop dead” end date for
discovery, which complicates court calendars and litigant
expectations.
x Further, phased discovery brings added deadlines and calendaring,
and so may lengthen cases, particularly because legal work often
expands to fit the time required for its completion.
x Similarly, a dishonest litigant could misuse phased discovery to drag
out a case, creating added cost and waste.
x More practically, splitting discovery into phases may create
redundancy as parties “go back over” prior discovery and, in some
cases, need to re-depose witnesses.
x Lastly, phased discovery may be hard to implement in cases where
intangible constitutional rights are at stake and the most important
evidence may be less clear.
This section describes each stated issue in turn.
A. “Phased Discovery Stretches Judicial Resources Too Thin”
The genesis of this criticism is a legal truism: the more judges have to
oversee, the more work it takes for them to provide oversight.117 Phased
116. See Carroll, supra note 54, at 459 (citing In re Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 108
F.R.D. 331 (N.D. Cal. 1985)):

[The 1983] amendments formally interred any argument that discovery should be a free form
exercise conducted in a free for all spirit. Discovery is not now and never was free.
Discovery is expensive. The drafters of the 1983 amendments to sections (b) and (g) of Rule
26 formally recognized that fact by superimposing the concept of proportionality on all
behavior in the discovery arena. It is no longer sufficient, as a precondition for conducting
discovery, to show that the information sought “appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.” After satisfying this threshold requirement counsel also
must make a common sense determination, taking into account all the circumstances, that the
information sought is of sufficient potential significance to justify the burden the discovery
probe would impose, that the discovery tool selected is the most efficacious of the means that
might be used to acquire the desired information (taking into account cost effectiveness and
the nature of the information being sought), and that the timing of the probe is sensible, i.e.,
that there is no other juncture in the pretrial period when there would be a clearly happier
balance between the benefit derived from and the burdens imposed by the particular
discovery effort.
117. This oversight is proper, in that courts have broad case management authority. See
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discovery can, and should, operate with little judicial intervention, just like the
current system of proportional discovery. But the statistics, common
perception, and scholarship all agree that proportional discovery is not working
that way, meaning that judicial intervention may need to become more
prevalent in a mandatory phased system.
But how much oversight would a phased discovery system require? Setting
a first phase of discovery with or without consensus of the parties would
require no more additional work from a chambers than setting a proportional
scope as required by the 2015 amendments to the discovery rules. The
additional work occurs later in discovery when, instead of managing the end of
a discovery period that is all-encompassing, the judge is managing the end of a
discovery period that may continue into the future.118 The judge would then be
determining what discovery, if any, should be part of the next phase. This
activity itself is not much different than a case ongoing today in which a singlephase discovery period is about to end, and a litigant is arguing that because of
recently-discovered facts, “hide the ball” misconduct, or temporal limitations
that the discovery period be extended and/or the scope of discovery heightened.
In other words, many complex litigations today are multi-phase cases; they just
look like single-phase cases in which the sole fact discovery deadline is
“kicked” one or more times.119
It is certainly possible that in some instances a party will argue for a
tranche of information to be included in Phase one of discovery, not get their
way, and just plunge forward with that discovery in Phase one, requiring
limited judicial intervention to put an end to such transgression. In this sense a
savvy judge will assist the parties in setting phases, then utilize a magistrate or
discovery master for “problem” cases, as extensive judicial oversight may be
difficult.120
FED. R. CIV. P. 16(c)(2)(F) (courts’ broad authority over timing of discovery); FED. R. CIV. P.
16(c)(2)(E) (timing of summary judgment motions).
118. Indeed, this “extra work” often happens anyway. See SEDONA CONFERENCE
COMMENTARY, supra note 80, at 12 (“[C]ourts generally consider extrinsic information
submitted by the parties to determine whether requested discovery is sufficiently important
to warrant potentially burdensome or expensive discovery. Such evidence may include the
parties’ opinions regarding the likely importance of the requested information, whether the
requested information was created by ‘key players,’ whether prior discovery permits an
inference that the requested information is likely to be important, whether the creation of the
information requested was contemporaneous with key facts in the case, and whether the
information requested is unique.”).
119. Experienced litigators know that, in most cases, it is not difficult to “kick” a
discovery deadline. Under FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4), for a party to secure modification of the
scheduling order, it must demonstrate good cause and obtain the judge’s consent. To meet
the good cause standard, the party must show that, despite its diligence, it could not
reasonably have met the scheduling order deadline. See S&W Enters., L.L.C. v. SouthTrust
Bank of Ala., N.A., 315 F.3d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 2003).
120. William Hubbard, The Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation,
64 CATH. U. L. REV. 867, 903 (2015) (“Parties should be provided tools to reduce discovery
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Will it require more work than the emphasized proportional
discovery under the 2015 amendments? Perhaps not. After all, the
amendments clearly contemplate a judge setting limits on discovery that
are narrower than the current broad scope. Further, the hope of phased
discovery is that it results in less discovery, less disruption, and quicker
settlements. If it works as it should in the aggregate, the reduction in judicial
work on the cases for which it works should outweigh the increase in judicial
work for “problem” cases.
Further, the Chief Justice has strongly suggested that judges need to
spend more time managing discovery:
[Under the 2015 amendments] [j]udges must be willing to take on a
stewardship role, managing their cases from the outset rather than allowing
parties alone to dictate the scope of discovery and the pace of litigation. Faced
with crushing dockets, judges can be tempted to postpone engagement in
pretrial activities. Experience has shown, however, that judges who are
knowledgeable, actively engaged, and accessible early in the process are far
more effective in resolving cases fairly and efficiently, because they can
identify the critical issues, determine the appropriate breadth of discovery, and
curtail dilatory tactics, gamesmanship, and procedural posturing.121

Even if phasing does create an extra workload for judges, such, unfortunately,
is the reality of modern litigation.
B. “Phased Discovery Creates Discovery Without End”
There is a perceived advantage in single-stage discovery: a “hard”
discovery deadline date, held by a strong-handed judge, will result in time- and
content-certainty to discovery not present in a multi-phase system. A phased
discovery, one could argue, lacks that benefit. Since nobody will know when
discovery will actually end, nobody will know when the trial will be. Since no
litigant can effectively budget for the great unknown, no litigant can effectively
set a meaningful settlement figure. Thus phased discovery becomes a war
without end that actually drags on and is more, not less, expensive. Also, the
concern is that phase discovery may make it hard for judges and parties to
know from the outset of a case how involved subsequent phases of discovery
will be such that setting a trial date may be hard.
However, as described above, in many instances, many complex litigations
today suffer from extended discovery deadlines due to logistical issues, newlydiscovered facts, and tomfoolery. 122

costs because active judicial oversight of discovery, although widely praised as highly
effective, rarely occurs.”).
121. ROBERTS 2015 REPORT, supra note 41, at 7, 10.
122. For example, in Anthony Biddle Contractors, Inc. v. Preet Allied American Street,
LP, 28 A.3d 916, 925-26 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) the Pennsylvania Superior Court referred to
hard discovery deadlines as tantamount to termination of the action, and urged trial courts to
be lenient in granting extensions.
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Setting a trial date has long been recognized as a way to keep litigation
moving, and foment settlement,123 but multi-phase discovery does not prevent
a judge from setting a trial date. It merely means that the judge should consider
additional phases of discovery into the schedule before setting it. This situation
can, and should, mean that a case that ordinarily may require four months of
discovery has a first phase set with a deadline two months out, with the
expectation that further phases may, but need not, follow. Therefore, the
schedule in a multi-phased case is, at the end, the same schedule as before, but
with fact discovery split into separate segments. Therefore, the trial date can be
set at the outset of the case with some manner of certainty.
Lastly, any lack of certainty caused by the specter of endless phases of
discovery can be offset by the entire point of phased discovery in the first
place: that after the most important discovery in a case is complete, the parties
get enough of a sense of the admissible facts in a case to settle the whole
mess.124 There should be an inherent offsetting value in that proposition.
All of this is not to deny that, in certain cases, phased discovery will
provide some uncertainty. That is why the theory articulated by this Article is
to keep phasing strongly recommended, but ultimately optional. There are
certain cases in which phased discovery may not be appropriate. These cases
will be discussed more specifically in section 7.
C. “Phased Discovery Will Take Too Long and Cost Too Much”
The next criticism of phased discovery is that phased discovery equals a
longer discovery period, and a case with a longer discovery period will cost
more money because it takes longer to resolve. Key to this criticism is the
observation that legal work is particularly susceptible to “Parkinson’s Law,”
which, as propounded by the twentieth-century British scholar C. Northcote
Parkinson, states, “work expands to fill the time available for its
completion.”125
Critics of the billable hour have long said that its underlying premise lends
itself to inefficiency, among many other dubious characteristics.126 That is to
123. Andrew J. Wistrich & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, How Lawyers’ Intuitions Prolong
Litigation, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 576 n. 17 (2013) (citing Malinda M. Sanders, Settlement
on the Courthouse Steps, 61 BENCH & B. MINN. 16 (Sept. 2004) (referring to the common
sentiment that “I know that the pressure of an imminent trial date sometimes has more
influence over parties’ decision to settle than any other factor”)).
124. Again, phased discovery works. See Section II.1 supra and accompanying notes.
125. Parkinson’s
Law,
DICTIONARY.COM,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/parkinson-s-law (last visited Dec. 22, 2015).
126. Susan Saab Fortney, The Billable Hours Derby: Empirical Data on the Problems
and Pressure Points, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 171, 180-81 (2005); Steven J. Harper, The
Mar.
28,
2013,
Tyranny
of
the
Billable
Hour,
N.Y.
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/29/opinion/the-case-against-the-law-firm-billablehour.html.
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say that there is an economic incentive for a lawyer to spend just as much time
as practicable—but not too much—on any given task, matter, or client.127 Or as
put more fully:
Under a law firm budget based upon billable hours, the best way to increase
revenue is either to increase the billing rate or increase the number of hours
billed. As competition among law firms has increased over the years, the
ability to raise rates has depended largely upon the economy. The classic
supply-and-demand model dictates that raising rates far above what is
generally charged in the marketplace will reduce demand for services by that
practitioner. With rate increases limited by such economic influences, law
firms desiring to increase their revenues resort to increasing the number of
hours billed. The result of increasing the number of hours billed, however,
heightens ethical dilemmas for the profession.128

One gets the idea, if politely put. This expansion of work may not be
entirely the practice of dishonest lawyers; uninformed, stressed out lawyers
may participate as well.129
That is, however, the more salacious way to present this issue. The more
mundane way involves accounting for “catch-up” time. That is to say, billable
legal work in which an attorney reacquaints herself with the facts of a case
and/or catches up a colleague, temporary replacement, or permanent
replacement.130 Longer running cases mean more “catch-up time,” which is
inefficient.131 And if under a phasing scheme cases contain the same amount of
discovery, just spread out over more time, the cost criticism holds some water.
Ultimately the frustration inherent in this particular issue is one that
expands beyond phasing, beyond proportionality, and in a sense beyond
127. Katherine L. Brown & Kristin A. Mendoza, Ending the Tyranny of the Billable
Hour: A Mandate for Change for the 21st Century Law Firm, 51 N.H. B.J. 66, 67 (2010).
128. Id.
129. Christine Parker & David Ruschena, The Pressures of Billable Hours: Lessons
from a Survey of Billing Practices Inside Law Firms, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 619, 624 n.31
(2011) (citing Jesse Nelman, A Little Trust Can Go a Long Way Toward Saving the Billable
Hour, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 717, 722 (2010) (“[A]busive billing may actually be the
result of both billing ignorance and poor billing judgment, which are sustained by an
environmental pressure for lawyers to conform to the unethical billing practices of their
colleagues. Put simply, lawyers may not know the practices they employ are unethical.”)).
130. It should be noted that phased discovery may well be unfairly harsh to third
parties, given that they generally are involved in cases due to matters outside of their control
and stand to gain little from the exercise of responding to subpoenas. See Amy Pomerantz
Nickerson, Coercive Discovery and the First Amendment: Toward a Heightened
Discoverability Standard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 841, 882 (2010) (noting that “in many cases the
third party will often have little connection to the underlying action”). Therefore it may be
prudent to not phase third-party discovery, allowing third parties in some instances to do one
fell swoop of a collection rather than be pulled into a case on numerous occasions.
131. See, e.g., The Washington Economics Group, Inc., The Economic Impacts of
Delays in Civil Trials in Florida’s State Courts Due to Under-Funding, FLA. B. ASS’N
WEBSITE,
Feb.
9,
2009,
http://www.floridabar.org/TFB/TFBResources.nsf/Attachments/1C1C563F8CAFFC2C8525
753E005573FF/$FILE/WashingtonGroup.pdf.
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discovery. This problem can be recast as being more about the modern efficacy
of a billable hour system of potentially unlimited expense and revenue as the
standard means by which clients pay for litigation. Such a system will
inherently lend itself to use by good and bad actors, as well as those in
between.132 And the billable hour system, while certainly trending down in
popularity, will not disappear overnight.133 While it is certainly a “dodge” to
conclude that Parkinson’s Law is a billable hour problem and not a phased
discovery problem, it is certainly worth consideration as a mitigating factor.
Phased discovery does work better in a system with spending limits.134
Lastly, this is a problem mitigated once again by the whole purpose of
phased discovery; phased discovery should mean less discovery, in which case
costs ought to be lower. If a phased discovery case takes longer for a period of
three phases with ten depositions and 100,000 produced documents, at which
point it settles with some discovery still outstanding, that case will likely still
be cheaper than the same case in a shorter one-phase regime with twenty
depositions and 200,000 documents.
D. “A Dishonest Litigant Could Misuse Phased Discovery”
Discovery misconduct is an unfortunate byproduct of a legal system so
large and complicated that it must rely on the unsupervised cooperation of
adversaries. It will not go away no matter what the rules are or become.
That being said, it is worth examining whether phased discovery makes
discovery misconduct more likely, which would be a consideration in its
effectiveness. The types of discovery misconduct generally are serving
unnecessary discovery, failing to cooperate in scheduling or administering
discovery, failing to respond to discovery altogether, and withholding or
concealing key evidence.135 Motives for discovery misconduct run the gamut.
A bad lawyer plays fast and loose with discovery for many reasons, including
132. See Brown & Mendoza, supra note 127, at 67; Douglas McCollam, The Billable
Hour: Are Its Days Numbered?, THE AM. LAW., Nov. 28, 2005,
http://www.americanlawyer.com/id=900005441810/The-Billable-Hour-Are-Its-DaysNumbered?slreturn=20160408203026.
133. See PAUL M. BARRET, How Billable Hours Changes the Legal Professon,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Dec. 4, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201412-04/how-billable-hours-changed-the-legal-profession, (Explaining that the billable hour
remains popular despite common distaste because “[i]t gives clients some basis for auditing
how they’re being billed, and it rewards richly those attorneys who find ways to keep the
meter running.”).
134. Indeed, phased discovery works well within one commentator’s discovery cost
solution of assigning a “litigation budget” or “cap” to spending in a litigation. See Tidmarsh,
supra note 3.
135. See, e.g., David A. Grenardo, Tales from the Abyss: What Does it Take to Get
Disbarred These Days? (ABA Section of Litigation Joint Committees’ CLE Seminar,
Jan. 19-21, 2012), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2114594] (2012), Social Sciences Research
Network 2114594
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(but by no means limited to) because his case is bad;136 because he is too busy
to effectively participate in the matter; because he is a jerk; or because his
client demands it.137 Many techniques and motives act directly or collaterally
as means to delay a lawsuit and make it more costly for an opponent, a nasty
business that makes the lawsuit more costly for the court as well.
Since the result of phased discovery may mean elongated discovery, but of
a lesser scope, it does seem as if potential misconduct is an issue. First, the bad
actor will almost certainly argue for the largest possible discovery scope,
regardless of propriety. More discovery equals more money spent. The
increased emphasis on proportionality in the 2015 amendments brings the
discussion of proportionality out of the parties’ initial conference, where this
foolishness would first surface, and puts it before a judge, where this
foolishness can be curtailed.138 Phased discovery preserves this additional
oversight and enhances it by requiring the parties and judge to agree on even
more aspects of discovery.
In a phased system the parties and the judge are not just agreeing on the
outer boundaries of what is discoverable. They are agreeing on the identity of
the most important information to be discovered and the method of obtaining
that information at the lowest possible cost. Foolishness in the face of this
process will be more difficult to sustain than it was in 2014.139
E. “Phased Discovery Will Force a Single Witness to Endure Multiple
Depositions”
It is likely that a multi-phased discovery process would result in the redeposition of key witnesses. “Non-overlapping” is key, as Rule 26(b)(1)
prohibits discovery that is “unreasonably cumulative or duplicative.”
Although there are no specific limitations on the number of times a person
can be deposed, courts tend not to favor repeat depositions absent a compelling
reason to order them.140 Such compelling reasons usually involve newly
136. As Edward Bennett Williams is said to have said, “A continuance is the same thing
as an acquittal, it just doesn’t last as long.” See, e.g., Elaine McCardle, HLS Negotiation
Workshop Hosted Robert Barnett, and Jack and Suzy Welch, HARV. L. TODAY (Mar. 27,
2009),
http://today.law.harvard.edu/hls-negotiation-workshop-hosted-robert-barnett-andjack-and-suzy-welch.
137. See Grenardo, supra note 135.
138. Indeed, that is exactly what the Chief Justice would like to see happen. See
ROBERTS 2015 REPORT, supra note 41, at 7 (“The amended rules accordingly emphasize the
crucial role of federal judges in engaging in early and effective case management.”).
139. See Girard & Espinosa, supra note 17; Michael Murphy, Proposed Federal Rules
Will Discourage Document Dumps, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 31, 2013),
http://www.thelegalintelligencer.com/id=1202635329141/Proposed-Federal-Rules-WillDiscourage-Document-Dumps?slreturn=20151108212029.
140. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Co. v. Lasko Products, Inc., No. 01 C 7867, 2003 WL
1220254 *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 14, 2003) (finding that the court is “generally opposed to
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discovered or unreasonably withheld evidence.141
In a phased discovery model, however, re-depositions could occur without
newly discovered or withheld evidence. Rather, they would be a necessary factgathering mechanism in cases where the discovery phases tracked key areas of
the parties’ legal theories, such as a liability phase one versus a damages phase
two.
Some courts have concluded that the hardship of re-deposition, especially
for key witnesses, is not so great as to make it anathematic to discovery.142
Nevertheless, a re-deposition in phased discovery is certainly a possibility, and
the difficult or expensive availability of a witness should be a factor in setting
the scope of each phase.
F. “Phased Discovery Will Bring About Serial Summary Judgment
Motions”
Particularly in instances in which discovery phases track the legal
cornerstones of a complaint, it is easy to see a situation in which an aggressive
litigant would take several “cracks” at summary judgment.
For example, if a case for breach of contract were split into phases that
tracked the elements of a breach of contract claim, with the first phase
dedicated to evidence of a contract, and so forth, it is possible that a wily
defendant will make serial motions for summary judgment after every phase in
an effort to: (a) drive up costs for other parties and (b) take every opportunity to
exit the case.
The Federal Rules do not preclude serial summary judgment motions,
though judges discourage them.143 A trial court has discretion over how such
motions can be brought. Therefore, judges can hedge against this situation
simply by choosing not to consider dispositive motions until discovery is fully
complete, and suggesting (as some already do) that serial dispositive motions
are disfavored.144
redeposing witnesses absent a clear showing of substantial need by the movant”);
Graebner v. James River Corp., 130 F.R.D. 440, 441 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
141. Graebner, 130 F.R.D. at 441.
142. See, e.g., Armstrong v. Hussman Corp., 163 F.R.D. 299 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (ordering
re-deposition of witnesses).
143. See, e.g., Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., No. 1:14-cv-1734WTL-DML, 2015 WL 4523514, at *1-2 (S.D. Ind. July 27, 2015) (admonishing litigant for
bringing multiple summary judgment motions).
144. For example, the Southern District of Indiana has amended its Uniform Case
Management Plan to include the following language regarding summary judgment motions:
“[a]bsent leave of court, and for good cause shown, all issues raised on summary judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 must be raised by a party in a single motion.” Uniform Case
Management Plan, 7 http://www.insd.uscourts.gov/case-management-plans; see also, e.g.,
Order at 3, Cooper v. Shelby County (No. 07-2283 STA\cgc) (W.D. Tenn. June 11, 2010),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCOURTS-tnwd-2_07-cv-02283/pdf/USCOURTS-tnwd-
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G. “Phased Discovery Is Only for Even-Footing ‘Money’ Cases”
It is lastly true that phased discovery works better for some cases than
others. This is so about any discovery system, of course, but it bears examining
the “hard” cases and determining how phased discovery can be effective. The
first such concern is of “information imbalance” or “information
asymmetry.”145
Information asymmetry creates a scenario in which one party possesses all
of the information necessary to set the proportions of discovery and the
reasonable scope of each phase. The other party can only guess at an
appropriate scope based on much more limited information.146 Therefore one
party can use that knowledge to drive the scope of discovery by making a case
that the most helpful evidence to its legal theories be developed first (or last)
depending on its tactical needs. A defendant, for example, with all of the
evidence in its possession, might attempt to fashion phases of discovery so that
the most helpful exculpatory evidence be examined first, allowing it to gain
leverage in ongoing settlement discussions.
Judges can alleviate the potential gamesmanship by heeding the rules’
direction to focus on access to discovery and to take an information-possessing
party’s suggestion of phasing sequence with caution. Some judges may even
wish to provide deference to the phases and scope proposed by the party
without the information. Doing so could make the first phase of discovery an
exercise to level the playing field with respect to information possession and
allow both parties to examine record facts on equal footing, which would
provide for more balanced settlement discussions. For example, under Judge
Grimm's phasing regime he defines this first phase as a “base level” discovery
“proportionate to the needs of the case, the burden and expense of which is
borne by the producing party with the provision that any further discovery must
be conditioned on a showing of good cause and an assessment of cost
allocation.”147
Further, the Committee Notes caution against the trap of letting the amount
in controversy, the most quantitative of all factors, become the dominant factor
2_07-cv-02283-5.pdf (stating that dispositive motions cannot be “endless”).
145. This phenomenon is described in the committee notes to the 2015 Amendments:
“The direction to consider the parties’ relative access to relevant information adds new text
to provide explicit focus on considerations already implicit in present Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
Some cases involve what often is called “information asymmetry.” One party — often an
individual plaintiff — may have very little discoverable information.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26
advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendments, at B-40.
146. See, e.g., Rodney A. Satterwhite & Matthew J. Quatrara, Asymmetrical Warfare:
The Cost of Electronic Discovery in Employment Litigation, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9, 11
(2008).
147. Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform:
How Small Changes Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495,
511 (2013).
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in determining proportionality:
It also is important to repeat the caution that the monetary stakes are only one
factor, to be balanced against other factors. The 1983 Committee Note
recognized ‘the significance of the substantive issues, as measured in
philosophic, social, or institutional terms. Thus the rule recognizes that many
cases in public policy spheres, such as employment practices, free speech, and
other matters, may have importance far beyond the monetary amount
involved.’ Many other substantive areas also may involve litigation that seeks
relatively small amounts of money, or no money at all, but that seeks to
vindicate vitally important personal or public values.148

This sentiment reflects a change made in the 2015 amendments, where,
after the public comment period, the proportionality standard’s “amount in
controversy” factor was moved to a secondary position behind “the importance
of the issues at stake in the action.”149 A system of phased discovery places a
greater emphasis on determining the most important discovery and examining it
first. This decision-making process is the cornerstone of a proportionality
analysis. In other words, the information discovery most likely to be
“proportional” is also the information most likely to be discovered in the “first”
or “early” phases. So it is prudent for judges and parties to be sensitive to using
the right determinants. Using the “importance of the issues at stake” as a means
to expand the initial phase of discovery is commonsensical.
Indeed, in cases with extremely important issues, phasing need not be
employed.150 However, if it is to become a useful tool for discovery, it should
be the norm, used in most cases, with “hard” cases as potential exceptions.
Making phasing purely optional does little to change the status quo as it is
today. After all, the current rules presently provide for phasing in any and every
case.
IV.

BUT WOULD IT TAKE?: THE PRACTICAL RESISTANCE TO PHASING

It is difficult to ignore at this point that the reasons for phasing discovery
are fairly straightforward and simple, taking little real estate in this article, yet
the contemplated obstacles to its implementation are numerous, varied, and

148. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes to 2015 amendments, at B-41-B-42.
149. See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, The 2015 Civil Rules Package As Transmitted to

Congress, E-DISCOVERY BLOG, (June 15, 2015), http://www.theediscoveryblog.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/10/2015SummaryofRulesPackage.pdf.
150. See Carroll, supra note 54, at 465 (discussing a fixed discovery budget as “an
interesting concept, but a limited one, because it calls for a global proportionality analysis
rather than a specific one. Where what is at stake is solely money and the maximum and
minimum amounts can be easily quantified, pursuit of a discovery budget and limiting
discovery based on that budget may well make sense and be appropriate. In a contract action,
for example, where the maximum damages are $100,000, that figure may well represent
what is ‘at stake’ in the litigation. But such monetizing of what is ‘at stake’ is not so easy
where the issue is not breach of contract but constitutional or statutory civil rights.”).
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lengthy. Why is that? One side effect of phased discovery that will make it
more difficult to implement is its efficiency; if it works the way it should, there
should be fewer cases, cases should be shorter, and litigants should be spending
less on lawyers and (in many cases) more on redress of grievances.
Something about that last sentence may have jumped out at many readers:
the part about lawyers being paid less. That is the idea of proportionality in
general and phased discovery in particular; as one can imagine, it is easier said
than done when the principal drivers of implementation are doing so at the risk
of their own bottom line.151
On the other hand, it is also useful to note once again that phasing is
completely possible under the existing discovery rules and encouraged by the
new rules.152 Yet it is not prevalent. Why not? Once again it seems overly=
simplistic to accredit this circumstance to inertia, although inertia should not be
ignored. Or rather, perhaps inertia should be more closely examined. Why is
change so hard to come by in the legal industry?
A colloquial example with respect to the broader practice in electronic
discovery may come to mind. Client asks a Lawyer why Lawyer has printed out
electronic documents to review them, citing the inherent inefficiency in time
and money for such an archaic practice. Lawyer responds that he has over thirty
years of experience reviewing documents for trial on paper, following a certain
process, which has produced exceptional results at a rate greater than mere
chance would dictate. Lawyer presents his own metaphor to Client, asking
Client to imagine a scenario in which Client was to undergo surgery. A surgeon
is about to operate on Client—heart surgery—and gives Client a choice: a
three-hour surgery at added cost, but using a method the surgeon knows by
heart, or a two-hour surgery that is cheaper, but uses a method that the surgeon
will be trying for the very first time. No patient, and no Client, would want to
be the first test case, given the stakes.153
151. See Tidmarsh, supra note 3, at 910-11 (discussing how limiting discovery cost is
not exactly in an unethical lawyer’s best interest). There is something to be said, however,
for more efficient and less expensive cases reducing a barrier to the courts for parties,
especially those with lesser means. Less expensive court cases may end up meaning that
more litigants file more cases, making for more fees for more lawyers. See Ray Brescia,
Disrupting the Law: How Technology Can Help Bridge the Justice Gap, HUFFINGTON POST
TECH: THE BLOG (Nov. 3, 2014, 04:16 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/raybrescia/disrupting-the-law-how-te_b_6093062.html; Michael Zuckerman, Is There Such a
(May
30,
2014),
Thing
as
an
Affordable
Lawyer?,
ATLANTIC
http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/05/is-there-such-a-thing-as-an-affordablelawyer/371746.
152. See, e.g., Laura E. Ellsworth et al., Significant Changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Expected to Take Effect December 1, 2015: Practical Implications and
What
Litigators
Need
to
Know,
JONES
DAY
(Sept.
2015),
http://www.jonesday.com/significant-changes-to-the-federal-rules-of-civil-procedureexpected-to-take-effect-december-1-12015-practical-implications-and-what-litigators-needto-know-09-25-2015.
153. Of course, “imagine I’m a doctor” is one of the most classic and popular fallacies
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Ultimately, the reasoning behind this illustration may be the underlying
source of anticipated resistance to phasing, and also the explanation for its lack
of prevalence. There is simply a resistance to trying a new method that may not
work, when so much is (or at the very least, can be) at stake in litigation. No
lawyer wants to explain to a client, nor a judge to litigants, that a new way of
resolving a case did not work effectively. It is the fear of the “unknown
unknown.”154 The idea that a smoking-gun document could exist in some
corner and never see the light of a trier of fact is one with a real grip on the
minds of attorneys, even if the reality is that many smoking-gun documents are
known to parties at the outset of litigation, and others are generally too
potentially relevant to avoid discovery.
In this way the axiom “the perfect is the enemy of the good” comes to
mind. “Perfect” discovery is not only simply unattainable given the fallible
nature of human recollection, it is simply not economically feasible given the
complexity of big data. Indeed, the resistance to phasing may look like the
industry's similar resistance to technology assisted review, which went from
science fiction to accepted methodology in roughly three years.155 Insistence on
a perception of perfection through total completion comes at the expense of
better systems, a point not lost on the judges adopting predictive coding.156
Opponents of machine-aided review refused to accept the hard data which
clearly showed that TAR results in more effective and efficient document
review.157 Over time—a brief amount of time—the hard data showed that
predictive coding, while seemingly “inhuman,” was faster, cheaper and more
effective than human review.158
Here, phasing asks those similarly situated to accept a related idea: that
human eyes cannot efficiently nor effectively lay upon all relevant materials in
discovery, and that some potentially relevant information should be disregarded
without human review.159 It follows that an insistence that the human eyes
committed by members of the bar. We can put that logical issue aside for the purposes of this
example.
154. See STEYN, supra note 19 (quoting Donald Rumsfeld).
155. Rio Tinto PLC v. Vale S.A., 306 F.R.D. 125, 126-27 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (discussing
technology assisted review’s road to acceptance, collecting cases, and stating that “[i]n the
three years since Da Silva Moore, the case law has developed to the point that it is now black
letter law that where the producing party wants to utilize TAR for document review, courts
will permit it.”). The Author of this Article remembers explaining TAR to a senior partner at
a law firm in 2012, and receiving a response that could charitably be described as
“extraordinarily suspicious.” That same partner now routinely uses TAR.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Maura R. Grossman & Gordon V. Cormack, Technology-Assisted Review in EDiscovery Can Be More Effective and More Efficient Than Exhaustive Manual Review, 17
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 11, 43 (2011); Tim Stuhldreher, Predictive Coding Cuts Discovery
Expenses, 28 CENT. PA. BUS. J. 19 (2012).
159. See, e.g., Laporte & Redgrave, supra note 24, at 22-23 (“[P]erfection in preserving
all relevant electronically stored information is often impossible.” (quoting Comm. on Rules
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review all potentially relevant material is counterproductive to the advancement
of technology in litigation.
The anticipated resistance to phased discovery is that it is antithetical to the
notion that a litigant has an unalienable right in discovery to examine every slip
of paper or every byte of data that could potentially make his case. However, as
seen herein, this notion: (1) was never the intent of the Federal Rules and is
therefore not accurate;160 (2) is dangerously unworkable in the current era of
Big Data; and (3) is a self-defeating notion.161
The adoption of the 2015 FRCP amendments is still in its infancy, so time
will tell whether or not they achieve their desired effect—and the effect judges
want them to have—of increasing the use of proportionality as a limitation to
discovery.162 If, as judges say, the rules cannot overstate the importance of a
proportionality analysis, why not require that analysis?
The current rules suggest such a result, but the lack of a requirement that
judges use them allows for parties to set discovery—bilaterally or
unilaterally—in the same old inefficient way.
Judicial involvement is necessary in 2016 and beyond.163 Requiring a

of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Summary of the Report of the
Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rules App. B-61 at 41
(Sept. 2014))) (noting that “[i]t is now beyond dispute that gathering and reviewing all
available potentially relevant electronic data is a practical impossibility in most cases.”).
160. Id. at 22 (noting that proportionality was first introduced in a revised Rule
26(b)(1)(iii) in 1983 to “address the problems of discovery that is disproportionate to the
individual lawsuit” by limiting discovery or “bring[ing] about more tailored discovery,” and
describing this event as a “watershed moment” in the development of the FRCP).
161. This notion is self-defeating because, as discussed herein, it is the rare case indeed
in which a collection and fulsome examination of every single discoverable piece of
information would be a cost effective method of resolving a dispute. Most, if not all, cases
are not worth an examination of all discoverable information. See, e.g., Green, supra note
14.
162. For example, a panel of federal judges stated that “the importance of
proportionality cannot be overstated in the Rules. The Rules already state that the Court must
limit discovery if it determines that the burden or expense of discovery outweighs the
benefit. So some definition for proportionality has been added. A new factor is ‘the parties’
relative access to information.’ This clause was added to take into account asymmetrical
discovery and information.” Chuck Kellner, Georgetown eDiscovery Institute 2014 Update
on Changes to FRCP, D4 DISCOVERY (Nov. 20, 2014), http://d4discovery.com/discovermore/2014/11/georgetown-ediscovery-institute-2014-update-on-changes-tofrcp#sthash.RL6t37oC.dpuf.
163. See Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., No. 2:14-cv-1131, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
165040, at *19 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015) (stating expressly that the new Rules prescribe
“active judicial case management”); ROBERTS 2015 REPORT, supra note 41, at 9-10 (“The
2015 civil rules amendments are a major stride toward a better federal court system. But they
will achieve the goal of Rule 1—‘the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding’—only if the entire legal community, including the bench, bar, and
legal academy, step up to the challenge of making real change. . . . It will also require a
genuine commitment, by judges and lawyers alike, to ensure that our legal culture reflects
the values we all ultimately share.”).
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system of phased discovery is a strong way to make sure that discovery is
proportional to the needs of the case and that the court and the parties “secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding.”164
CONCLUSION
Phasing is a common, proven technique used by savvy attorneys as a
means to cooperatively limit discovery in a case, saving time and money.
Phasing is used routinely by influential jurists such as Judge Paul Grimm as a
standard for discovery cases, bringing reduced costs and better economy of
judicial resources.165 Such is the cooperation contemplated by, and even
required by, the amendments to the 2015 rules. Practitioners should insist on
phased discovery. Judges should require it.

164. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
165. See Grimm, Discovery Order, supra note 102
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